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behavioral economics theory of ambiguity aversion, which finds that individuals prefer known
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criminal history and credit history, both of which are currently targeted by legislatures and by
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INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits explicit employment
discrimination on the basis of sex,1 but its efficacy in achieving gender
equity in the workplace remains in doubt.2 Following Title VII’s passage,
women made rapid progress in the workplace,3 yet by the 1990s, progress
began to stall,4 and a seemingly intractable barrier to gender equity has
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
The role of Title VII in reducing employment discrimination remains contested. For a critical
assessment of the empirical literature examining whether Title VII succeeded in improving labor
market outcomes for those in the protected classes, see generally Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett
Shinall, Fifty Years Later: The Legacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
424 (2015), which examines the legacy of the Civil Rights Act in terms of its impact on wage,
employment, and segregation outcomes for its five protected classes.
3 Women’s labor force participation grew rapidly in the second half of the 20th century, rising
from 33.9% in 1950 and peaking at 60% in 1999. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF LABOR, CHANGES IN MEN’S AND WOMEN’S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES (Jan. 10,
2007), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2007/jan/wk2/art03.htm [https://perma.cc/9647-TXCG]; see also Francine
D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations 45 (IZA
Discussion Paper No. 9656, 2016), http://ftp.iza.org/dp9656.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML9X-4FBF]
(documenting “a decline in the unexplained gender wage gap”). See generally Claudia Goldin, The
Quiet Revolution That Transformed Women’s Employment, Education, and Family, 96 AM. ECON. REV.
1 (2006) (documenting the phases of women’s advancement in the labor market); Hersch & Shinall,
supra note 2 (discussing the role of Title VII in women’s improved labor market prospects).
4 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR
FORCE: A DATABOOK 1 (2015), http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-databook/archive/women
-in-the-labor-force-a-databook-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJB6-VK2T] (“Since [1999], labor force
participation among women has declined, to 57.0 percent in 2014 . . . .”). These recent changes in
labor force participation rates have been widely reported and analyzed. See, e.g., Chinhui Juhn &
1
2
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remained: how to balance work and family.5 In light of the undeniable reality
that men and women do not have equal procreative or childrearing roles,6
work–family balance is universally perceived as a constraint on employment
for women, but not for men.7 Mechanisms to achieve work–family balance,
as a result, must take priority in any realization of workplace equality on the
basis of sex. Laws intended to support work–family balance, such as the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act8 and the Family and Medical Leave Act,9
Simon Potter, Changes in Labor Force Participation in the United States, 20 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer
2006, at 27 (reviewing the trends contributing to the drop in the labor force participation rate from
2000 to 2005); Diane J. Macunovich, Reversals in the Patterns of Women’s Labor Supply in the United
States, 1977–2009, 133 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov. 2010, at 16 (profiling the decline in women’s labor
force participation in the first decade of the twenty-first century).
5 For prior analyses of challenges of work–family balance, see generally MARY ANN MASON & EVE
MASON EKMAN, MOTHERS ON THE FAST TRACK: HOW A NEW GENERATION CAN BALANCE FAMILY
AND CAREERS (2007); KARINE MOE & DIANNA SHANDY, GLASS CEILINGS AND 100-HOUR COUPLES:
WHAT THE OPT-OUT PHENOMENON CAN TEACH US ABOUT WORK AND FAMILY (2009); NAT’L
WOMEN’S LAW CTR., 50 YEARS AND COUNTING: THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF ACHIEVING FAIR
PAY (2013), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/final_nwlc_equal_pay_report.pdf [https://perma.cc
/S2E2-4R7A] (analyzing the continuing barriers to fair pay for women and proposing state and federal policies
to address these barriers); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, JESSICA MANVELL & STEPHANIE BORNSTEIN, “OPT OUT”
OR PUSHED OUT?: HOW THE PRESS COVERS WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT (2006), http://www.work
lifelaw.org/pubs/OptOutPushedOut.pdf [https://perma.cc/PM29-P3F9] (analyzing how media publications
reinforce the idea that women are increasingly choosing to leave work and offering a critique of that storyline).
6 The current status of childbearing technology limits childbearing to women. Time use studies
unambiguously demonstrate that even though fathers have increased their time involvement with childcare,
mothers still spend far more time on childcare than fathers—even when both parents are employed full-time.
Data on time use, categorized by parental status and sex, are available from the American Time Use Survey.
See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Married Parents’ Use of Time, 2003–06
(May 8, 2008), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CF4-TY3W].
7 See generally Joni Hersch, Home Production and Wages: Evidence from the American Time Use
Survey, 7 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 159 (2009) (showing a pay penalty for time spent on housework
that is larger for women than for men); Joni Hersch & Leslie S. Stratton, Household Specialization and
the Male Marriage Wage Premium, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 78 (2000) (showing that married men
earn more than otherwise comparable single men); Joni Hersch, Male-Female Differences in Hourly
Wages: The Role of Human Capital, Working Conditions, and Housework, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 746
(1991) (demonstrating that home production adversely affects women’s earnings but not men’s); Joni
Hersch, Sex Discrimination in the Labor Market, 2 FOUND. & TRENDS MICROECONOMICS 281 (2006)
(describing economic models of household decisionmaking that lead women to specialize in home
production and men to specialize in market work); Martha S. Hill, The Wage Effects of Marital Status
and Children, 14 J. HUM. RESOURCES 579 (1979) (showing that marriage and fatherhood are associated
with higher pay for men but not for women); Shelly Lundberg & Elaina Rose, Parenthood and the
Earnings of Married Men and Women, 7 LAB. ECON. 689 (2000) (showing that women who exit the
workforce for child-related reasons experience a pay penalty).
8 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012) (expanding the meaning
of sex within the statutory text of Title VII in order to prohibit discrimination on the basis of “pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions”).
9 The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 (2012), provides up to
twelve weeks of unpaid leave for new mothers who are qualified employees working for qualified
employers. To qualify as an employee under the FMLA, the employee must have worked for the
employer for at least one year and at least 1250 hours. Id. § 2611(2)(A). To qualify as an employer, the
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have proven inadequate as a means of equalizing opportunity in the
employment relationship.10
In the absence of any specific legislative guidance within the text of Title
VII regarding how to equalize opportunity, Title VII’s sex discrimination
provisions have spawned a series of information restrictions concerning the
discussion of work–family matters. These restrictions largely derive from an
overly broad reading—and, sometimes, a misreading—of Title VII case law by
employers, employees, and even the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the federal agency entrusted with enforcing the Act. To
help employers navigate the issue of marital status inquiries during job
interviews, the EEOC provides guidance such as the following:
Questions about marital status and number and ages of children are frequently
used to discriminate against women and may violate Title VII if used to deny
or limit employment opportunities.
It is clearly discriminatory to ask such questions only of women and not men (or
vice-versa). Even if asked of both men and women, such questions may be seen
as evidence of intent to discriminate against, for example, women with children.11

This language warns employers that pre-employment questions about
marital status and the number and ages of children risk violation of Title VII.
Undoubtedly, this guidance is well-intentioned and instituted in recognition
that these factors may be used to discriminate against hiring married women
with children.12 However, law serves not only to establish order and protect
employer must have at least fifty employees working for at least twenty weeks per year. Id. § 2611(4)(A).
The Family and Medical Insurance Leave Act, a bill that would mandate paid maternity leave at the
federal level, was introduced in both houses of Congress in 2013 and 2015; each time, however, the bills
died in the House Ways and Means Committee and in the Senate Finance Committee. See Family and
Medical Insurance Leave Act, H.R. 1439, 114th Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/
hr1439/BILLS-114hr1439ih.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HJQ-F5ST]; Family and Medical Insurance Leave
Act of 2013, H.R. 3712, 113th Cong. (2013), https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3712/BILLS-113hr3712
ih.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS7U-UVTD].
10 See, e.g., Charles L. Baum II, The Effect of State Maternity Leave Legislation and the 1993 Family
and Medical Leave Act on Employment and Wages, 10 LAB. ECON. 573, 591 (2003) (demonstrating that
the FMLA did not increase women’s employment or wages); Christopher J. Ruhm, Policy Watch:
The Family and Medical Leave Act, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 175, 184-85 (1997) (arguing that the FMLA
has provided relatively few benefits to employees); Jane Waldfogel, The Impact of the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 18 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 281, 299-300 (1999) (finding that neither
women’s employment or wages improved after the FMLA).
11 Pre-Employment Inquiries and Marital Status or Number of Children, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/inquiries_marital_status.cfm [https://pe
rma.cc/6FEZ-FT6B] [hereinafter PRE-EMPLOYMENT INQUIRIES GUIDANCE].
12 See, e.g., Jenny Che, 10 Questions Employers Can’t Ask You in a Job Interview, HUFFINGTON POST
(Apr. 9, 2015, 4:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/09/off-limits-questions-job-interviews_n_7
028050.html [https://perma.cc/TA7D-M574] (“Here are the questions interviewers should never ask but
sometimes do anyway: . . . Are you married? . . . Do you have children or plan to?”); Louise Kursmark,

2016]

Something to Talk About

53

rights, but also to promulgate norms.13 Current interpretations of Title VII
send the message that family life and work life are to remain separate. In
contrast, consider many other topics that may naturally arise in the preemployment setting—athletic pursuits, travel, and hobbies.14 Discussion of
such topics helps employers and applicants understand whether there is a fit
with the workplace culture.15

Keep the Interview Legal, MONSTER (2016), http://hiring.monster.com/hr/hr-best-practices/recruiting-hir
ing-advice/interviewing-candidates/legal-job-interview-questions.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZD73-SWQ4]
(“Questions about marital status and family issues are discouraged except as they relate to job
performance.”); Illegal Interview Questions and Female Applicants, FINDLAW (2016), http://employment.find
law.com/hiring-process/illegal-interview-questions-and-female-applicants.html#sthash.tRHlEV7C.dpuf
[https://perma.cc/ZF6T-EPQS] (“Despite warnings to the contrary, some employers ask inappropriate
questions during the job interview process that border on illegality including questions about a female
applicant’s family life, marital status, and child rearing plans.”).
13 The role of law in promulgating norms is known as the expressive function of law and is the
subject of a rich literature by leading legal scholars including Richard McAdams, Lynn Stout, Robert
D. Cooter, and Cass R. Sunstein. See generally RICHARD MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF
LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS (2015); LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD
LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE (2011); Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 585 (1998); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649
(2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). For a work
examining the mutual influence of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation on the expressive attempts of the
law “to inform and educate the public as to what is socially and morally desirable,” see Yuval Feldman,
The Complexity of Disentangling Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance Motivations: Theoretical and Empirical
Insights from the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 16 (2011).
14 See, e.g., Ashley Faus, 4 Things You Didn’t Know You Could Put on Your Resume, MUSE (Feb. 2, 2012,
10:22 AM), https://www.themuse.com/advice/4-things-you-didnt-know-you-could-put-on-your-resume
[https://perma.cc/TU6D-7JSD] (suggesting that volunteer work, professionally-relevant hobbies, nonprofessional experiences, and interests contribute to a “compelling, well-rounded, and interesting”
résumé); Gabriela Gardoş, What to Do with Those Extracurricular Activities on Your CV, GRADUATELAND
(Oct. 6, 2015), http://graduateland.com/article/how-to-integrate-extracurriculars-in-your-CV [https://
perma.cc/AT2E-CAWN] (“[A]n interesting activity may make it easier for you to stand out to an
employer.”); Rachel Gillett, Here Are the Personal Interview Questions One CEO Asks During Every Job
Interview, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 19, 2016, 11:12 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/personal-interviewquestions-one-ceo-always-asks-2016-1 [https://perma.cc/5GGA-MWEB] (describing how one CEO asks
job candidates about the books or magazines they are reading and what candidates do in their spare time).
15 See Daniel M. Cable & Timothy A. Judge, Interviewers’ Perceptions of Person–Organization Fit
and Organizational Selection Decisions, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 546, 555 (1997) (concluding that
“interviewers base their [person–organization] fit evaluations on the congruence between their
perceptions of applicants’ values and their organizations’ values”); Bradford Cornell & Ivo Welch,
Culture, Information, and Screening Discrimination, 104 J. POL. ECON. 542, 562 (1996) (demonstrating
that “the hiring decision is influenced not only by the similarity of the applicant’s and the
interviewer’s race, sex, or other minority status but also by the similarity of their general
background”); Lauren A. Rivera, Hiring as Cultural Matching: The Case of Elite Professional Service
Firms, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 999, 1017 (2012) (arguing that hiring is “a process of cultural matching
between candidates, evaluators, and firms”); Manuel F. Bagues & María José Pérez Villadóniga, Why
Do I Like People Like Me? 3 (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Working Paper No. 08-06, 2008)
(showing that employers “tend to give a higher valuation to the candidate who excels in the same
dimensions as [the employer] does”).
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Notably, although employers are prohibited from asking questions about
marital status and children in a way that violates Title VII, applicants are in no
way prohibited from volunteering such information. Yet, job candidates refrain
from doing so. Indeed, it is so widely understood that pre-employment inquiries
about family matters are prohibited that applicants may reasonably assume that
they too are forbidden from volunteering such personal information and that
doing so would undermine their employment prospects. Job applicants’ fear of
volunteering information about family matters is further compounded by the
popular career advice that also discourages such volunteering.16
The processes by which job applicants reach an understanding that family
matters are off limits in the workplace derive from two related sources. First,
drawing on theories of the expressive value of law, the promulgation of such
laws and EEOC guidance informs the public that such questions are
discriminatory. A second source derives from the tendency of people to imitate
others in deciding whether to obey the law,17 often without knowledge of the
actual legality of the imitated action by the party being imitated.18 Our
situation is conceptually similar in that job applicants and employees are not
prohibited from discussing family matters, but the restriction on employers to
ask about the topic sends a message that such conversations are off limits, and
indeed prohibited, in the employment setting. The practical result of the
workplace information restrictions on employers and employees—restrictions
that hazily trace their roots to Title VII—is a widespread fear engendered in
both employers and employees of discussing family matters in the workplace.
In this Article, we examine the consequences of these workplace information
restrictions and argue that a new approach is needed to achieve workplace equity.
Specifically, we present findings from an original experimental study designed
to identify whether providing information about family matters, as opposed to
concealing this information, influences hiring decisions. Our experimental
16 See, e.g., Kristin Colella, 7 Tips for Stay-at-Home-Moms Returning to Work, MAINSTREET (May 9,
2014, 7:56 AM), https://www.mainstreet.com/article/7-tips-stay-home-moms-returning-work/page/4
[https://perma.cc/RF2P-LWA2] (advising applicants not to discuss parenting and housekeeping skills); Tips
for Moms Returning to the Work Force, ABC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2003), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=124
887&page=1 [https://perma.cc/ERR6-6DHE] (“Avoid talking about your children and your family.”).
17 A substantial literature documents that imitation is widespread over numerous situations.
See, e.g., Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network
over 32 Years, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 375-77 (2007) (showing that weight gain spreads via social
networks); C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 1147, 1184-95 (2009) (discussing the interplay of imitative behavior and intellectual property
law in the fashion market); W. Kip Viscusi et al., Private Recycling Values, Social Norms, and Legal
Rules, 124 REVUE D’ECONOMIE POLITIQUE 159, 169-71 (2014) (demonstrating that recycling laws
influence social recycling norms).
18 See Bert Huang, Shallow Signals, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2227, 2227 (2013) (“Seeing others act
illegally, we gather that a rule is weakly enforced or that its penalty is not serious. But we may be
imitating by mistake: what others are doing might not be illegal – for them.”).
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design is based on the realistic and statistically valid observation that many
women leave the workforce for family reasons,19 yet wish to reenter the
workforce after a period of time.20 This exit-and-reentry situation provides a
plausible framework, given the current legal environment, for examining the
role of information about family matters in hiring decisions. Fielded on over
3000 subjects, our study provides evidence—perhaps the first of its kind—that
workplace information restrictions may actually serve to stifle, rather than
improve, workplace equity. More specifically, our study finds that otherwise
identical applicants with a substantial gap in their work history who do not
explain the personal family circumstances surrounding their job search are far
less likely to be hired than those who do. Furthermore, the content of the reason
provided for the job search does not matter; any explanation improves
employment prospects relative to no explanation.
Though perhaps counterintuitive, in fact, behavioral economics theory
predicts our findings. According to the behavioral tendency known as
“ambiguity aversion” or the “Ellsberg Paradox,” named after Daniel Ellsberg,
the economist who first posited the theory,21 individuals prefer known risks
over unknown risks, for any given level of risk.22 Although ambiguity aversion
is regarded as a form of economically irrational behavior, it is a widespread

19 See Sharon R. Cohany & Emy Sok, Trends in Labor Force Participation of Married Mothers of Infants,
130 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 2007, at 9, 10-12 (showing lower labor force participation rates among
married women with young children); D’VERA COHN ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., AFTER DECADES OF
DECLINE, A RISE IN STAY-AT-HOME MOTHERS 5 (2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/
2014/04/Moms-At-Home_04-08-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8HP-PXSC] (documenting that in 2012,
29% of mothers stayed at home with their children).
20 See generally MASON & EKMAN, supra note 5 (discussing strategies for professional women
seeking to reenter the workforce after exiting for family reasons); Sylvia Ann Hewlett & Carolyn Buck
Luce, Off-ramps and On-ramps: Keeping Talented Women on the Road to Success, 83 HARV. BUS. REV. 43,
46-47 (2005) (discussing the common penalties for women who leave the workforce and later wish to
return). News coverage on the prevalence of professional women who exited the workforce for family
reasons and seek to reenter is extensive. See, e.g., Jennifer Preston, Back in the Game, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
18, 2014, at F1. Universities, career counseling firms, and major employers have established programs
targeted at professional women seeking to reenter the workforce. See, e.g., New Directions for Attorneys,
ELISABETH HAUB SCH. OF L., http://law.pace.edu/newdirections [https://perma.cc/W8XQ-G27U]
(giving an example of a university-based program); IRELAUNCH: THE RETURN TO WORK EXPERTS,
http://www.irelaunch.com [https://perma.cc/U7WQ-QCRF] (providing an example of a program
offered through a career counseling firm); Return to Work, MORGAN STANLEY, http://
www.morganstanley.com/people-opportunities/return-to-work.html [https://perma.cc/7ZVN-B8PG]
(giving an example of a program offered through a major private employer).
21 See generally Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643 (1961).
22 Id. at 657 (finding that individuals differentiated between uncertainties based on “the nature
of one’s information concerning the relative likelihood of events. . . , a quality depending on the
amount, type, reliability and ‘unanimity’ of information, and giving rise to one’s degree of
‘confidence’ in an estimate of relative likelihoods”).
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behavioral phenomenon.23 In the hiring context we examined, we found that
subjects preferred to hire the candidate who provided information about family
characteristics over the uncertain alternative who offered no such information.
The experiment is structured so that the additional information provided is not
informative as to the probability that the candidate will be productive; only the
ambiguity of the employers’ beliefs is affected.
Although the number of stay-at-home fathers has increased since the 2008
recession, the number still remains quite small compared to the number of
stay-at-home mothers.24 The burdens associated with childcare and home
production still largely fall on women, as even today, only one in five fathers with
preschool-aged children assume primary caregiving responsibility.25 The result
for employers is that, in contrast to the situation for women, little additional
information is provided by discussing men’s parental status, so the role of
ambiguity with respect to family status is less of an issue when hiring men.26
Consequently, we argue that the EEOC guidance discouraging pre-employment
questions about family matters has outlived its value—to the extent it ever
provided value. Our argument stands in contrast to the positions of several
employment discrimination scholars who have recently advocated for increasing
blanket family-status protections in the workplace.27 While their intentions are

23 See generally Mark J. Machina & Marciano Siniscalchi, Ambiguity and Ambiguity Aversion
(surveying numerous experiments demonstrating ambiguity aversion), in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE
ECONOMICS OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 729 (Mark J. Machina & W. Kip Viscusi eds., 2014).
24 Compare Gretchen Livingston, Growing Number of Dads Home with the Kids, PEW RES. CTR.
1 (2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/06/05/growing-number-of-dads-home-with-the-kids
[https://perma.cc/WTR3-7HS9] (finding two million stay-at-home fathers in 2012), with COHN ET
AL., supra note 19, at 6 (finding 10.4 million stay-at-home mothers in 2012).
25 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, One-Third of Fathers with Working Wives Regularly Care
for Their Children (Dec. 5, 2011), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/children/cb11198.html [https://perma.cc/6BW9-GEDW].
26 See Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1297,
1317 (2007) (finding employment discrimination against mothers, but not fathers); Rebecca Glauber, Race
and Gender in Families and at Work: The Fatherhood Wage Premium, 22 GENDER & SOC’Y 8, 17 (2008)
(documenting differences in parental wage premiums for fathers of different races and ethnicities).
27 See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between Public Law
and Voluntary Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081, 1086-87 n.13 (2010)
(characterizing the EEOC caretaker guidance as a “[k]ey development[] in achieving greater
inclusion and equal treatment of working caregivers”); Noreen Farrell & Genevieve Guertin, Old
Problem, New Tactic: Making the Case for Legislation to Combat Employment Discrimination Based on
Family Caregiver Status, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1463, 1465-66 (2008) (arguing for new federal legislation
that prohibits “family responsibilities discrimination”); Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of
Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1533-36 (2011)
(labeling parental status and marital status as “puzzling exclusions” from current federal
antidiscrimination laws); Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family
Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1315 (2008) (characterizing the EEOC Title VII caretaker guidance as “the
single most important recent development in the field” of family responsibilities discrimination).
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admirable, these scholars, we believe, have failed to consider the practical
ramifications of blanket family-status protections in the workplace for mothers
seeking a family-friendly career. At the time of passage of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, in the absence of out-of-home childcare,28 employment of mothers of young
children was rare.29 Now it is entirely the norm.30 No longer is the question
whether a mother will work, but instead what jobs provide a match that allows
work–family balance. The practical result of the EEOC guidance—or any policy
that discourages an honest discussion of family matters between employees and
employers in today’s workplace—is that it suppresses information, which
disparately harms women’s employment prospects.
Our employment experiment creates a realistic context to examine the
importance of laws that result in the suppression of information with
implications that may extend to the role of information exchange in the legal
context more generally. To our knowledge, we are the first to examine the
influence of ambiguity aversion in the context of employment law. Although
our focus in this Article is on the consequences of workplace information
restrictions on gender equity in the workplace, the significance of workplace
information restrictions is far broader and is relevant not only to women, but
to all historically underserved groups protected by employment discrimination
laws. For example, two widely advocated proposals to increase workplace equity
for disadvantaged groups include restrictions on criminal background checks31
and credit history checks32 by employers. Such proposals are simply another
28 See Elizabeth U. Cascio & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, The Impacts of Expanding Access
to High-Quality Preschool Education, 2013 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 127, 139-45
(discussing historic expansions in early childcare).
29 See Facts over Time, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR: WOMEN’S BUREAU (2016), http://www.dol.gov/
wb/stats/facts_over_time.htm#labor [https://perma.cc/DCQ5-JRCV] (revealing low labor market
participation rates of mothers in the 1970s); cf. CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER
GAP: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN 125 (1990) (“Women who desire careers
might reduce their fertility or have children later in life.”).
30 See Mothers and Families: Labor Force Participation, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR: WOMEN’S BUREAU
(2016), http://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/mother_families.htm [https://perma.cc/Q3C8-UTYT] (documenting a
69.9% labor participation rate for mothers with children under the age of eighteen).
31 For a discussion of laws that limit employers’ ability to consider criminal history, see Hersch &
Shinall, supra note 2, at 450, noting that “the rise in state and local ban-the-box laws, as well as private
compliance . . . suggests that society is moving in the direction of considering criminal background checks
as a form of employment discrimination.” See also U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, No.
915.002, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS
UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/
arrest_conviction.cfm [https://perma.cc/R9RA-RM52]; NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, “BAN THE BOX” IS
A FAIR CHANCE FOR WORKERS WITH RECORDS (2016), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Ban-theBox-Fair-Chance-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2F2-K43W] (discussing the success and proliferation
of ban-the-box laws and fair-chance policies throughout the United States).
32 See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (2016) (“[I]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory
practice for an employer, labor organization, employment agency, or agent thereof to request or to
use for employment purposes the consumer credit history of an applicant for employment or
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form of workplace information restrictions. As a result, the evidence
presented in this Article suggests that these restrictions may likewise have
adverse consequences on their intended beneficiaries.
In making the argument against such information restrictions in
employment, this Article proceeds as follows: Part I highlights the familiar
scenario of a worker who regularly confronts the information restrictions that
motivate our experimental study—a mother who exited the labor force to care
for her children and now wishes to reenter the workplace. This example, not
coincidentally, also forms the basis for our experimental study. Part II
discusses the evolution of the case law and current EEOC guidance on
permissible interview questions—particularly as they relate to reentering
stay-at-home mothers—while Part III explains the behavioral economics
theory of ambiguity aversion in the context of the ambiguity created by this
EEOC guidance. Part IV places our experimental study in the context of
prior work on hiring discrimination in economics scholarship and prior
experimental work in legal scholarship. Part V details our experimental
design, and Parts VI and VII explore our findings and their implications for
the current workplace norm against requesting or volunteering information
regarding family matters.
I. INFORMATION RESTRICTIONS AT WORK: THE EXAMPLE
OF STAY-AT-HOME MOTHERS
Even though workplace information restrictions may impact job applicants
and employees of many backgrounds, these restrictions are perhaps most visible
and most pervasive as they relate to women in the workplace. Imagine, for
example, the case of Amy, an associate at a large law firm.33 After the birth of her
first child, Amy initially plans to return to work, but later changes her mind due
to the short duration of her maternity leave. The next several years bring two
additional children and multiple geographic moves to accommodate her husband’s
career, and before she knows it, Amy has been out of the labor force for ten years.
And yet, Amy is not satisfied to remain a homemaker for the rest of her days;
instead, now that her children are school-aged and her husband’s career is more
settled in one location, Amy wants to go back to the practice of law.

employee, or otherwise discriminate against an applicant or employee with regard to hiring,
compensation, or the terms, conditions or privileges of employment based on the consumer credit
history of the applicant or employee.”).
33 This example is loosely based on the story of Amy Beckett, whose struggle to return to work
after a career break was documented by Katherine Reynolds Lewis in The Return: A Stay-at-Home
Mom Attempts to Go Back to Work After Nearly Two Decades. Can She Revive Her Career?, WASH. POST
(Apr. 4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/29/AR2010032902
620.html [https://perma.cc/4QGL-JYWT].
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Like Amy’s decision to stay at home with her children, similar decisions
made by other American mothers to exit the workforce may be motivated by
a number of factors, including a desire to be present during their children’s
formative years, the high cost of childcare, and the lack of federally mandated
paid family leave.34 The choice to become a stay-at-home mother upon the
birth or adoption of a child is extremely common—approximately 30% of
women with children do not work outside the home—thus, our experimental
design reflects a common situation.35 But stay-at-home mothers do not
necessarily view their decision to leave the labor market as permanent; they often
view their decision as a career break, rather than a career exit.
For the many mothers like Amy who eventually desire to end their career
break—perhaps because their children have gone to school, or perhaps because
their financial situation has changed—the road to labor market reentry is uphill
and fraught with uncertainty. During their absence, their former industry may
have changed, their skills may have become outdated, and their business
connections may have dwindled.36 Yet even the stay-at-home mothers who have
avoided these common labor market reentry issues and are ready to jump back
into the workforce must confront one unavoidable problem: no matter how
impressive their credentials were at the time they left the workforce, their
résumés will indicate a gap in their employment history.
As a result, numerous websites37 and articles38 are devoted to advising
stay-at-home mothers such as Amy on how to effectively reenter the labor
market. Instead of being forthcoming with employers, reentering mothers
typically are advised to mask employment gaps in their résumés through
See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (2012); id. § 2612(c) (providing unpaid family leave).
See COHN ET AL., supra note 19, at 5 (reporting that the share of mothers who did not work
outside of the home was 29% in 2012); see also Julie L. Hotchkiss, M. Melinda Pitts & Mary Beth
Walker, Labor Force Exit Decisions of New Mothers, 9 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 397, 412 (2011)
(demonstrating that “declining labor market exit rates among women upon the birth of a child made
an about-face in the late 1990s and started to rise”); The Return of the Stay-at-Home-Mother,
ECONOMIST 2 (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21600998-after-fallingyears-proportion-mums-who-stay-home-rising-return [https://perma.cc/WDN5-NF24] (reporting the
share of mothers who did not work outside the home was 23% in 2000).
36 See, e.g., Hewlett & Luce, supra note 20, at 46-49 (discussing the “penalties” and pitfalls
encountered by women who take time out of the labor market to care for children).
37 See, e.g., CORPS TEAM, http://www.corpsteam.com [https://perma.cc/ZY9M-83RX]; IRELAUNCH,
supra note 20; JOBS AND MOMS, http://www.jobsandmoms.com [https://perma.cc/8NZ3-GUMX].
38 See, e.g., Sharon Reed Abboud, Interview Tips for Stay-at-Home Moms Reentering Today’s Job Market,
MONSTER (2016), http://career-advice.monster.com/job-interview/interview-preparation/all-moms-work
-confidence-interview/article.aspx [https://perma.cc/9XWJ-ZHGD]; Susan Adams, Seven Keys to Rejoining
the Workforce After a Long Break, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2014, 9:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams
/2014/11/17/seven-keys-to-rejoining-the-workforce-after-a-long-break/#423dc54c74ca [https://perma.cc/LV
L4-ADSK]; Lindsay Olson, 6 Tips for Re-Entering the Workforce, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 2, 2014,
10:37 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/outside-voices-careers/2014/10/02/6-tips-re-enteringthe-workforce [https://perma.cc/MU46-EG32].
34
35
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strategies such as removing dates from their work history, listing freelance
and self-employment projects, and listing volunteer work as employment.39
Amy followed this popular advice in her own career search, listing her
volunteer experience at her children’s school on her résumé. But months of
searching and sending out résumés failed to give rise to a full-time job offer,
and Amy’s only option, if she wanted to take a job, was to accept occasional
part-time legal contract work.
Amy’s experience, which is based on the true story of Amy Beckett, a lawyer
profiled by the Washington Post in 2010,40 raises several questions: Are
reentering mothers receiving the right career advice? And why should
applicants like Amy be reluctant to volunteer that their employment gaps arose
from a parenting choice? In part, of course, is concern over stigma associated
with failing to conform to the male norm of the dedicated worker who
prioritizes work over family. Still, the employment gap is there, and it is real.
Failing to acknowledge and explain this gap may only raise questions that it
materialized from decisions and behaviors even less associated with labor
market success, such as lack of financial or intrinsic motivation for
employment,41 incarceration, mental illness, or substance abuse.
Of course, in the absence of an applicant volunteering information,
employers viewing a résumé like Amy’s could instead directly ask about a gap in
employment history. But such a question, employers may fear, could be viewed
as an implicit question about marital status and children, which is strongly
discouraged by the EEOC guidance.42 Indeed, as noted in the Introduction, the
agency suggests that any such inquiry may be used as “evidence of intent to
discriminate” in violation of Title VII.43 The conscientious employer will thus
refrain from asking anything that might lead to a mention of family matters, and
as a result, remain ignorant about the reasons underlying an applicant’s résumé
gap. And, in the absence of any concrete information, the employer is left to
guess whether the gap resulted from simply staying home with children, or from
something potentially of concern.
39 See, e.g., Kim Isaacs, Resume Tips for Full-Time Parents Returning to Work, MONSTER (2016),
http://career-advice.monster.com/resumes-cover-letters/resume-writing-tips/resume-tips-parents-returningto-work/article.aspx [https://perma.cc/WJT4-MYQZ] (recommending that stay-at-home parents create a
“functional resume” that emphasizes skills, while “downplaying . . . employment history”).
40 See Lewis, supra note 33.
41 In the employment context, intrinsic motivation refers to an individual’s desire to do a job for
its own sake, in contrast to extrinsic motivation, which is based on rewards for performance. See, e.g.,
Bruno S. Frey, On the Relationship Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Work Motivation, 15 INT’L J. INDUS.
ORG. 427, 428-30 (1997) (describing intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in the employment setting).
See generally David M. Kreps, Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 359
(1997) (discussing intrinsic and extrinsic motivation); Edward P. Lazear, Personnel Economics: Past
Lessons and Future Directions, 17 J. LAB. ECON. 199 (1999).
42 See PRE-EMPLOYMENT INQUIRIES GUIDANCE, supra note 11.
43 Id.
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As seen in Amy’s case, leaving an employer to guess the reason for an
employment gap may not end well for a job applicant, such that even highly
qualified candidates may have to scramble to find work upon reentry. In the case
of a mother like Amy, the potential for the unintended consequences of
information restrictions derived from employment discrimination law is clear.
The experimental work detailed in Parts V and VI is intended to evaluate both
the magnitude of these consequences and whether they outweigh the benefits
provided by such restrictions—in other words, to assess whether the story of Amy
is the exception or the rule. Before turning to the experimental work, we first
pause to trace the history of these Title VII–based information restrictions,
which, despite their inclusion in the EEOC guidance, are not grounded in the
plain language of the statute. Understanding the motivations behind these
restrictions, and their potential benefits, requires understanding the source.
II. THE ROAD TO IMPERMISSIBILITY FOR FAMILY-STATUS INQUIRIES
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from “fail[ing] or
refus[ing] to hire or . . . discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise . . . discriminat[ing]
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.”44 The Act does not contain any text about marital status,
parental status, or family status. Thus, a plain language reading of the statute
might suggest that employers are perfectly within their legal rights to ask
questions about family matters during job interviews. In contrast, the EEOC
best practices guidance on Title VII advises employers, “Do not ask questions
about the applicant’s or employee’s children, plans to start a family,
pregnancy, or other caregiving-related issues during interviews or
performance reviews.”45 The juxtaposition of the EEOC guidance with the
total absence of family-status language in the actual text of Title VII raises
two related questions: How did the EEOC decide that family-status inquiries
run afoul of Title VII? And how did such a strong norm against such inquiries
develop in the U.S. workplace?
The history of the proscription on family-status inquiries by employers
begins with an early Supreme Court decision on Title VII, Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp.46 In this 1971 case, the employer-defendant, Martin Marietta, had
a policy against hiring women with preschool-aged children (but not men with

44 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
45 Employer Best Practices for Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiver-best-practices.html [https://perma.cc/J6CQ-T

DYW] (last updated Jan. 19, 2011).
46 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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preschool-aged children).47 The plaintiff, Ida Phillips, had preschool-aged
children and had applied, but was rejected.48 Phillips, as a result, brought suit
under the theory that by treating women with preschool-aged children differently
than men with preschool-aged children, Martin Marietta was discriminating on
the basis of sex.49 The Supreme Court agreed and endorsed a novel theory of
liability under Title VII: the sex-plus theory.50 This theory—which has been
subsequently advanced by plaintiffs to contest employers’ differential treatment
of the sexes with respect to characteristics as far removed from the statutory text
of Title VII as grooming standards51 and weight52—supports liability when an
employer treats a certain characteristic more favorably in one sex than the employer
treats that same characteristic in the opposite sex. In this way, the sex-plus theory
brings employers’ differential treatment based on various characteristics not
mentioned in the statutory text within the ambit of Title VII.
Almost two decades after the Phillips decision, the Court decided Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a second case that laid the foundation for the EEOC
guidance and the strong norm against family-status inquiries by employers in
the American workplace.53 The case pitted a female employee who had been
denied partnership against one of the nation’s largest accounting firms.54 The
firm alleged that the employee, Ann Hopkins, had been denied partnership
because of her “abrasiveness” with staff members and poor “interpersonal
skills.”55 Hopkins, on the other hand, alleged that she had been denied
partnership because of her failure to conform to female stereotypes.56 Writing
for the plurality, Justice Brennan famously wrote,
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched
the stereotype associated with their group, for “[i]n forbidding employers to
Id. at 543.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 544.
See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(recognizing a cause of action under Title VII for sex differentials in grooming standards).
52 Most of the successful weight-discrimination cases under Title VII have been brought in the
context of airline weight restrictions on female flight attendants. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines,
Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 855 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that an airline’s policy of imposing weight maximums
for flight attendants violated Title VII); Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 610 (9th Cir.
1982) (holding that an airline’s policy of requiring flight hostesses to comply with strict weight
requirements was a violation of Title VII).
53 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
54 Id. at 231-32.
55 Id. at 234-35.
56 Id. at 235-36 (describing the advice Hopkins received from her employer to “walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry” (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985))).
47
48
49
50
51
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discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from
sex stereotypes.” An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose
positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible
catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not.
Title VII lifts women out of this bind.57

The case has henceforth stood for the proposition that discrimination on the
basis of a sex stereotype is discrimination on the basis of sex. As such, sex
stereotyping claims are cognizable under Title VII.
The Court has never directly addressed the issue of family-status inquiries in
the workplace. However, federal circuit courts have been confronted with this
issue and understandably have relied on both Phillips and Price Waterhouse in
reaching their decisions. For example, in King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the
Eighth Circuit found that a female plaintiff had successfully established a prima
facie case of sex-plus-family-status discrimination based on her allegation that the
employer had asked interview questions about “her marital status, the nature of
her relationship with another [Trans World Airlines] employee, the number of
children she had and whether they were illegitimate, her childcare arrangements,
and her future childbearing plans” because of her sex (i.e., the employer had not
asked male applicants such questions).58 More recently, the First Circuit
addressed a family-status issue in Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc.59 Here, the court
considered a case in which a female employee had been denied a promotion, and
the employer explained, “It was nothing you did or didn’t do. It was just that
you’re going to school, you have the kids and you just have a lot on your plate
right now.”60 The court found that this statement, combined with other similar
statements by the employer regarding the plaintiff’s childcare responsibilities,
could be characterized as both sex-plus and sex-stereotyping discrimination.61
Not all circuit courts, however, have been as willing to recognize family-status
inquiries as a form of sex discrimination. In Bruno v. City of Crown Point, for
instance, the Seventh Circuit reversed a lower court’s judgment in favor of a
female job applicant who had been asked about family planning and child

57 Id. at 251 (citing L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978))
(alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
58 738 F.2d 255, 256 (8th Cir. 1984); accord Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist.,
365 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir. 2004) (reversing a grant of summary judgment to an employer who inquired
how a female employee was “planning on spacing [her] offspring,” suggested she “not get pregnant until
[the supervisor] retire[d],” and advised the employee to “wait until [her son] was in kindergarten to
have another child”).
59 561 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2009).
60 Id. at 42.
61 Id. at 45-49.
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caretaking matters during her interview.62 In reaching its decision, the panel
majority looked to Price Waterhouse and cautioned, “[t]he fact that Pyle asked
only Bruno family-oriented questions reveals that those questions were based
on sex stereotypes—namely, that females are the primary care providers for
children and that the wife’s career is secondary to the husband’s.”63 However, the
court was careful to note that “[m]erely showing the questions were asked . . . is
not sufficient to prove intentional discrimination” under Title VII.64
In light of these Supreme Court and federal circuit court decisions, the
EEOC has issued guidance on appropriate interview questions for employers
to ask in order to avoid Title VII liability. While the EEOC acknowledges that
Title VII “do[es] not prohibit discrimination based solely on parental or other
caregiver status,” the agency emphasizes that such considerations by employers
may constitute sex-plus discrimination or sex stereotyping, which do violate
Title VII.65 Accordingly, the EEOC guidance reminds employers that “[r]elying
on stereotypes of traditional gender roles and the division of domestic and
workplace responsibilities, [such as] . . . assum[ing] that childcare responsibilities
will make female employees less dependable than male employees,” violates Title
VII.66 To underscore this point, the EEOC provides several examples of what it
considers to be “unlawful stereotyping” under Title VII.67 Two of the examples
involve a job interview in which a female candidate is asked how many children
she has and “how she would balance work and childcare responsibilities when the
need arose.”68 Another example involves a supervisor asking a female worker
who has just returned from maternity leave how she will “manage to stay on
top of her case load while caring for an infant.”69 The clear implication of all
the EEOC’s examples is that employers should avoid discussing work–life
balance with women in the workplace. Good employers, according to the
agency, keep their mouths shut.
In theory, the agency’s guidance may sound like good policy. By
discouraging employers from verbalizing their concerns about family matters,
such a policy arguably helps to shield employers from Title VII liability. The
agency’s goal is apparently to make family matters a non-issue in the
950 F.2d 355, 357-58 (7th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 362.
Id.
Questions and Answers About EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance on Unlawful Disparate Treatment of
Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.ee
oc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_caregiving.html [https://perma.cc/4ES7-6RKV] (last updated May 23, 2007).
66 U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, No. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
UNLAWFUL DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES 4 (2007),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html [https://perma.cc/HF4P-JB3C].
67 Id.
68 See id. at 4-5.
69 See id. at 5.
62
63
64
65
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workplace. Yet by discouraging employers from having honest discussions
about family matters and work–life balance with employees and job
applicants, the EEOC fails to consider the ambiguity that such a policy
creates in the minds of employers. In the next Part, we discuss why such
ambiguity may be more harmful than helpful to female employees.
III. CONSIDERING THE EFFECTS OF AMBIGUITY AVERSION
IN THE WORKPLACE
The dominant theoretical explanation for inferior labor market treatment
of historically disadvantaged workers is statistical discrimination.70 Statistical
discrimination arises when employers, who cannot directly observe job applicants’
productivity, assume that applicants have the average characteristics stereotypically
associated with their group, whether that group is based on race, sex, ethnicity, or
other observable characteristics. For example, theories of statistical discrimination
predict that employers will be, on average, less likely to hire women for positions
in which commitment to the employer is valuable since women, as a group,
tend to exit the workforce for family-related reasons more often than men.71

70 According to the economic theory of statistical discrimination, employers do not discriminate
based on animus toward particular traits (such as race or gender). Rather, in the absence of complete
information about a worker’s productivity, employers use these traits as proxies for productivity-related
characteristics. In other words, employers resort to stereotypes. See generally IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE
PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001)
(providing empirical evidence of race and gender discrimination outside of the markets governed by the
civil rights legislation of the 1960s); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) (critiquing the antidiscrimination norm for
neglecting the economic and social consequences produced by antidiscrimination laws); Dennis J. Aigner
& Glen G. Cain, Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor Markets, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 175
(1977) (identifying several shortcomings of models of statistical discrimination in explaining labor market
discrimination); Kenneth J. Arrow, Models of Job Discrimination (discussing the costs associated with
determining individual employee productivity relative to using race as “a cheap source of information”), in
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 83 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, Some
Mathematical Models of Race in the Labor Market (proposing that wage differentials and segregation may
derive from discriminatory attitudes of white employees in light of costs of information), in RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 187 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972); Edmund S. Phelps, The
Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659 (1972) (theorizing that employers rely on
characteristics such as skin color and sex as a stand-in for information about the individual applicant,
particularly when gaining such information would be costly); see also Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1320 (1989) (“Even if employers and their male
employees and customers have no discriminatory feelings and are perfectly well informed concerning the
average characteristics of women in the various types of job, it may be rational for employers to
discriminate against women because of the information costs of distinguishing a particular female
employee from the average female employee.”).
71 See GOLDIN, supra note 29, at 214 (“Women were ‘statistically discriminated’ against because as
a group they were more unlikely, for instance, to remain in the work force long after marriage, and as a
group they may have been pleased with jobs that involved a minimum of training.”).
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In the presence of policies that work to restrict information about female
applicants, statistical discrimination may play a role in hiring decisions for
women. Indeed, statistical discrimination may play a significant role in the
presence of any policy that restricts information available to employers. One
such policy that has recently received both popular and scholarly attention is
legislation seeking to restrict employer knowledge about a job applicant’s
criminal history (and in theory, reduce the importance of criminal history in the
hiring process). Well-known are the devastating effects that the rapid expansion
of the U.S. prison population since the 1980s have had on African-American men;
one in three African-American men can now expect to go to prison during his
lifetime.72 Having a criminal record lowers an individual’s employment and
earnings prospects.73 Because African-Americans are seven times more likely
than whites to be incarcerated, many scholars have observed that mass
incarceration has contributed substantially to economic inequality between the
two groups.74 This observation, in turn, has led to calls from both scholars and
social advocates to limit hiring practices that consider criminal history due to
the disparate negative impact that such considerations may have on male
African-American job applicants. The most popular proposals call for laws that
limit the use of criminal background checks by employers75 and for laws that
“ban the box”76 (a popular term for laws that restrict employers from asking
applicants about their criminal history on form job applications).

72 Sara Wakefield & Christopher Uggen, Incarceration and Stratification, 36 ANN. REV. SOC.
387, 389 (2010).
73 Accord Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 956 (2003) (finding
that admission of a criminal history on a job application form decreases applicants’ likelihood of being
called for a job interview).
74 See id. at 959 (concluding that “[t]he effect of a criminal record is . . . 40% larger for blacks than
whites” with respect to job interview callbacks); see also DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND
FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 28-57 (2007) (considering the post-incarceration
difficulties encountered by African-American men); Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment
and the Life Course: Race and Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 151, 164-65 (2004)
(considering the life cycle and class effects of mass incarceration on African-American men); Bruce
Western, The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and Inequality, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 526, 541-42
(2002) (arguing that mass incarceration contributes to persistent race-based wage gaps).
75 See, e.g., Johnathan J. Smith, Banning the Box but Keeping the Discrimination?: Disparate Impact
and Employers’ Overreliance on Criminal Background Checks, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 199
(2014) (arguing that employers’ use of criminal background checks raises concerns under Title VII).
76 See, e.g., Amy P. Meek, Street Vendors, Taxicabs, and Exclusion Zones: The Impact of Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Convictions at the Local Level, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 52-55 (2014) (highlighting
the success of the ban-the-box movement as a way to mitigate the effects of mass incarceration);
Christina O’Connell, Note, Ban the Box: A Call to the Federal Government to Recognize a New Form of
Employment Discrimination, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2801, 2832-35 (2015) (arguing for a nationwide
ban-the-box law); see also Joseph Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Employment Discrimination
Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1429, 1455-64 (2014) (providing a brief historical overview of the advocacy
and rationale behind the ban-the-box movement).
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These proposals are undoubtedly well-intentioned and, at first glance,
may sound like a good idea. Yet such policies may actually have adverse effects
on male African-American job applicants. A 2006 empirical study, for
instance, found that employers who performed background checks were more
likely to hire African-American males than employers who did not perform
such checks.77 In the absence of credible criminal history information, the
study authors theorized that employers statistically discriminated against
African-American men. Uninformed employers knew that African-American
men were much more likely to have a criminal record than other applicants
and, lacking credible information, used race as a proxy for a prior criminal
record.78 Contrary to the arguments made by many advocates and policymakers,
the study authors concluded that policies proscribing employer access to
information about applicant criminal history harmed African-American men
more than it helped them.79
In the context of criminal background checks, racial disparities in the
probability of a criminal record are stark and well-known, and restricting
employer access to an applicant’s criminal history can lead employers to favor
hiring non–African-Americans over African-Americans—that is, to statistically
discriminate. In the context of hiring women, gender disparities in the demands
of family responsibilities are similarly stark and well-known, so the theory of
statistical discrimination would predict that restricting access to employer
information regarding family matters would lead employers to favor hiring men
over women. The theory thus provides an explanation for why employers may
favor a male applicant over a female applicant, but says nothing about why
employers may favor one female applicant over another female applicant. In
this way, our framework explicitly departs from the statistical discrimination
context, focusing on how employers make decisions between members of the
same group in the absence of full information in order to isolate the role of
information exchange in the employment relationship.
Behavioral economists have long been concerned with how individuals
make choices in the face of uncertainty, as everyday decisionmakers rarely have

77 See Harry J. Holzer et al., Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring
Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451, 465 (2006) (“Employers that check are 8.4 percentage points
more likely to have hired an African American applicant into the most recently filled position.”).
78 See id. at 460 (“[E]mployers that are averse to hiring ex-offenders and that do not check
[backgrounds] are the most likely to engage in statistical discrimination.”).
79 See id. at 473; see also Michael A. Stoll & Shawn D. Bushway, The Effect of Criminal Background
Checks on Hiring Ex-Offenders, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 371, 396 (2008) (finding that because
“some employers perform background checks to gain additional information about the ex-offenders
whom they may consider hiring . . . [and] protect themselves against possible negligent hiring lawsuits,”
bans on such checks may have adverse effects on applicants with a criminal history).

68

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 165: 49

the benefit of full information.80 Within this vast economics literature, of
particular relevance here is the line of research that explores how individuals
make decisions when one option is ambiguous and the other option is less so.
The typical starting point for modern economists working on this topic is a
1961 paper by Daniel Ellsberg, who, through a series of examples, proposed that
even when the expected value of two options is identical, individuals prefer the
less ambiguous option over the more ambiguous option.81 Perhaps the most
famous of Ellsberg’s examples is the “two-color problem,” a scenario in which an
individual bets whether the color of a ball drawn at random from an urn will be
red or black.82 If the individual has a choice of two urns upon which to bet—one
urn in which the red/black ball distribution is known to be 50/50, the other urn
in which the red/black ball distribution is unknown—Ellsberg’s theory predicts
that the individual will prefer to bet on the urn with the known 50/50
distribution.83 Despite the possibility that the unknown urn, unlike its known
counterpart, may be filled entirely with balls of one color, individuals will still
choose to bet on the known urn.84
This theory, known as the Ellsberg paradox or ambiguity aversion, has
been subsequently validated and extended by the experimental economics
literature. A substantial literature has tested the Ellsberg scenarios in
experimental settings;85 other authors have extended Ellsberg’s work to
consider how individuals respond to more complex scenarios involving issues
such as comparing levels of ambiguity aversion for gains versus losses.86

80 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 284-86 (1979) (demonstrating that individuals give too much weight
to low-probability outcomes when making decisions under risk).
81 Ellsberg, supra note 21, at 668.
82 Id. at 650-56.
83 Id. at 651.
84 Id.; see also Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance, 110 Q.
J. ECON. 585, 585-86 (1995) (describing the two-color problem as an example demonstrating that
“people prefer to bet on known rather than unknown probabilities”); Howard Raiffa, Risk, Ambiguity,
and the Savage Axioms: Comment, 75 Q. J. ECON. 690, 694 (1961) (showing that the irrationality of having
a preference for the known distribution can be demonstrated by flipping a fair coin to govern the color
choice for the unknown urn, as doing so converts the uncertain probability to a hard probability).
85 See, e.g., Selwyn W. Becker & Fred O. Brownson, What Price Ambiguity? Or the Role of
Ambiguity in Decision-Making, 72 J. POL. ECON. 62, 73 (1964) (demonstrating that “some subjects, in
violation of the Savage axioms, express an aversion to ambiguity, and under payoff conditions will
pay to avoid it”); Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky, Who Accepts Savage’s Axiom?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. 368,
368 (1974) (showing “subjects’ initial choices often violated [Savage’s sure-thing principle]”).
86 See Michele Cohen et al., Individual Behavior Under Risk and Under Uncertainty: An
Experimental Study, 18 THEORY & DECISION 203, 219 (1985) (concluding that “under uncertainty as
under risk, there is no correlation between subject attitude in the domain of gains and in that of
losses”); Robin M. Hogarth & Hillel J. Einhorn, Venture Theory: A Model of Decision Weights, 36
MGMT. SCI. 780 (1990) (examining “attitudes toward risk and ambiguity as a function of different
levels of probabilities and payoffs”); see also Colin Camerer & Martin Weber, Recent Developments in
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Moreover, recent experimental work has found that ambiguity aversion is
particularly acute among women.87 In spite of the volume of work on ambiguity
aversion, the implications of this phenomenon have not been considered within
the employment context. Prior experimental work has focused on applications to
matters such as financial decisionmaking,88 contracts,89 and tax policy.90
By deterring open discussion of marital status and children, Title VII
removes the opportunity to work out reasonable accommodations at the
hiring stage,91 leaving firms in the position of using statistical discrimination.
Although Title VII does not require employers to reasonably accommodate
workers’ family life, employers have become increasingly willing to make
some voluntary accommodations, such as telecommuting,92 as a way to attract
the best workers, boost employee morale, and even increase productivity.93
For many employers, increasing the flow of information about family logistics
could remove a barrier to hiring women that arises from uncertainty about
Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 325, 332-41 (1992)
(providing a concise review of the massive ambiguity aversion literature in behavioral economics).
87 For a survey of recent literature that finds that women display greater ambiguity aversion
than men, see Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental
Evidence, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS RESULTS 1061, 1063 (John H. Kagel &
Alvin E. Roth eds., 2008).
88 See, e.g., Aurélien Baillon & Han Bleichrodt, Testing Ambiguity Models Through the Measurement
of Probabilities for Gains and Losses, 7 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 77, 85 (2015) (asking subjects
to take bets on the movement of a familiar stock index and an unfamiliar stock index).
89 See, e.g., Christian Kellner & Gerhard Riener, The Effect of Ambiguity on Reward Scheme
Choice, 125 ECON. LETTERS 134, 135-37 (2014) (demonstrating experimentally the effect of
ambiguity on preferences for contractual compensation schemes).
90 See, e.g., Arthur Snow & Ronald S. Warren, Jr., Ambiguity About Audit Probability, Tax Compliance,
and Taxpayer Welfare, 43 ECON. INQUIRY 865, 870 (2005) (demonstrating through experimental evidence
that increasing uncertainty regarding tax audit probability increases tax code compliance in “ambiguity
averse” individuals, but has the opposite effect in “ambiguity loving” individuals).
91 Title VII, unlike the Americans with Disabilities Act, does not require employers to reasonably
accommodate their employees. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (listing unlawful employer
practices with respect to race, color, sex, national origin, and religious discrimination without mention
of reasonable accommodation), with 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012) (defining discrimination as
including “not making reasonable accommodations” for a disabled employee). Employers may
voluntarily accommodate their employees, however, and likely will if they believe it will improve their
bottom line. See, e.g., NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE BUSINESS CASE FOR ACCOMMODATING
PREGNANT WORKERS (2012) (submitting that employers who accommodate pregnant employees can
expect increased employee commitment and satisfaction, recruitment and retention, productivity,
diversity, safety, and absenteeism with “minimal and temporary” associated costs).
92 According to a 2015 Gallup poll, 37% of U.S. workers telecommute to some extent for their job.
Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Telecommuting for Work Climbs to 37%, GALLUP (Aug. 19, 2015), http://
www.gallup.com/poll/184649/telecommuting-work-climbs.aspx [https://perma.cc/9J4B-NSUT].
93 See Jacob Morgan, Five Things You Need to Know About Telecommuting, FORBES (May 4, 2015,
12:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2015/05/04/5-things-you-need-to-know-abouttelecommuting/#2715e4857a0b368f7b2f12a0 [https://perma.cc/E8WQ-ECMM] (reporting results of
interviews with companies that see telecommuting as “a business imperative that is required to stay
competitive in the modern workforce”).
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how they will achieve work–family balance. Yet under policies informed by
the EEOC guidance, employers do not get the opportunity to engage in any
sort of interactive process and are instead left in a state of ambiguity with
respect to the needs of working-mother applicants.
One solution to this dilemma, suggested by both courts and the EEOC
guidance itself, is to mandate that employers who want to ask about family
matters and obligations do so equally with respect to male and female
applicants.94 Once again, this solution may seem reasonable at first glance,
but the economics literature on gender wage disparities illuminates why such
a solution may only exacerbate underlying concerns. There is a widely
established and large earnings premium for married men, but not for
women,95 so asking men and women equally about their marital status would
tend to benefit married men in the workplace, while hurting married women.
For all these reasons, we predict hiring practices that stifle information about
family status may be hurting women much more than they are helping
women. The next Part, which sets the foundation for our experimental
design, will explain how we test this hypothesis.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL FOUNDATIONS: EXAMINING HIRING PRACTICES
AND THE SHORTCOMINGS OF OBSERVATIONAL DATA
Theoretically, researchers might test the effect of policies that suppress
family-status information on employer hiring decisions by comparing observational
data from firms that have such policies to firms that do not. Yet identifying
discrimination in hiring based on observational data is extremely difficult. Firms
rarely maintain comprehensive data on applicants who were not hired, as
evidenced by their frequent inability to produce applicant flow data during
litigation.96 Furthermore, firms can only hire from the pool of applicants. A
statistical gap in the employment rate of members of protected classes may be due
to illegal discrimination in hiring on the part of the employer, but it could also be
See supra Part II (discussing the current EEOC guidance).
See Megan de Linde Leonard & T.D. Stanley, Married with Children: What Remains When
Observable Biases Are Removed from the Reported Male Marriage Wage Premium, 33 LAB. ECON. 72, 75-79
(2015) (presenting a meta-analysis of fifty-nine studies and 661 estimates showing a male marriage
premium of between 9% and 13%); Sanders Korenman & David Neumark, Does Marriage Really Make Men
More Productive?, 26 J. HUM. RESOURCES 282, 284-90 (1991) (providing an overview of the male marriage
premium literature, including the premium’s estimated magnitude and the theories behind the premium).
96 Indeed, the unavailability of firm applicant flow data can prove an insurmountable barrier for many
plaintiffs trying to prove hiring discrimination. For a discussion of plaintiff proof barriers in the absence of
applicant flow data in the context of criminal background check disparate impact cases, see Alexandra
Harwin, Title VII Challenges to Employment Discrimination Against Minority Men with Criminal Records, 14
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 2, 16 (2012) (“While federal courts were lowering the standards for
employers, they were elevating the standards of proof required for plaintiffs to establish disparate impact,
effectively barring plaintiffs unable to afford expert statisticians from pursuing disparate impact claims.”).
94
95
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the result of fewer, and potentially less qualified, applicants from the protected
classes, which would not necessarily be illegal.97
Consequently, economists have taken the approach of using experimental
studies to examine discrimination in hiring. Frequently, these experiments take
the form of a résumé audit (also called correspondence) study, in which fictitious
résumés are sent as applications to posted job openings. The résumés are
randomly sent in response to job openings and are designed to be identical with
the exception of indicators to signal the job applicant’s membership in a specific
class. In one of the most well-known résumé audit studies, Marianne Bertrand
and Sendhil Mullainathan sent applications that differed only in whether the
fictitious applicant had a name that was typically African-American or typically
white; applicants with typically African-American names had a lower probability
of receiving a callback for an interview.98 A large number of similar studies have
been conducted to investigate the role of other types of discrimination that may
play a role in the hiring process, including discrimination on the basis of sex,99
duration of unemployment,100 age,101 national origin,102 religion,103 weight (using
photos associated with résumés),104 and sexual orientation.105

97 It would not be illegal unless the employer engaged in an application practice that had a disparate
impact on a protected class, and the practice lacked job-relatedness or business necessity. See Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (“[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority
groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”).
98 See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha
and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 997-98 (2004).
99 See, e.g., Pascale Petit, The Effects of Age and Family Constraints on Gender Hiring Discrimination:
A Field Experiment in the French Financial Sector, 14 LAB. ECON. 371, 382-83 (2007) (finding significant
discrimination against women aged twenty-five relative to men aged twenty-five in high-skilled
financial sector jobs, but not against women aged thirty-seven relative to men aged thirty-seven).
100 See, e.g., Henry S. Farber et al., Determinants of Callbacks to Job Applications: An Audit Study, 106
AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 314, 317 (2016) (finding no relation between callback rates and
duration of unemployment).
101 See, e.g., Joanna N. Lahey, Age, Women, and Hiring, 43 J. HUM. RESOURCES 30, 46 (2008) (finding
younger applicants 42% more likely to be called back in Massachusetts and 46% more likely to be called
back in Florida).
102 See, e.g., Guillaume Pierné, Hiring Discrimination Based on National Origin and Religious
Closeness: Results from a Field Experiment in the Paris Area, 2 IZA J. LAB. ECON., Dec. 2013, at 1, 8-12
(finding significant discrimination against people of North African origin).
103 See id. at 8 (finding significant discrimination against Muslims).
104 See, e.g., Dan-Olof Rooth, Obesity, Attractiveness, and Differential Treatment in Hiring: A Field
Experiment, 44 J. HUM. RESOURCES 710, 729 (2009) (finding that applicants with “average” weight
and attractiveness are 20% more likely to receive a callback than applicants with “unfavorable” weight
and attractiveness).
105 See, e.g., Ali M. Ahmed et al., Are Gay Men and Lesbians Discriminated Against in the Hiring
Process?, 79 S. ECON. J. 565, 579 (2013) (finding significant discrimination against gay and lesbian
applicants in Sweden, though less discrimination than observed in other countries); Doris
Weichselbaumer, Testing for Discrimination Against Lesbians of Different Marital Status: A Field
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Résumé audit studies have been criticized on many grounds, including their
ethics106 and their limited external validity.107 An alternative experimental approach
to collecting data on the hiring process, and the one we use here, is a vignette study
(also known as a factorial study in the literature). Vignette studies combine survey
questions with experimental methods; they are an accepted and frequently used
methodology in a number of disciplines, including social psychology, sociology,
and law.108 This approach provides many advantages over résumé audit studies
in the context of our research question. First, we are interested in how the
restriction against asking for information on family status influences hiring.
Because of the popular understanding that questions about marital status and
children are illegal, applicants rarely provide information about their family
situation on their résumés; as a result, any fictitious résumés we might create
would automatically be suspect. Second, a vignette study allows us to construct
a plausible situation in which family status may be relevant in hiring. Because
most recent college graduates enter the labor market following graduation,
targeting only the kinds of entry-level jobs that are typically used in résumé
audit studies would not allow sufficient variation in family status.
As a result, our vignette study focuses on reentry of college graduate women
who have left the workforce for a sustained period of time. In order to achieve
adequate variation in family status, our scenario describes women who would
be in their early forties and who have had a ten-year interruption in their work
history. Although the employment prospects of returning stay-at-home
mothers versus new labor market entrants have not been formally compared

Experiment, 54 INDUS. REL. 131, 156 (2015) (finding significant discrimination against lesbian
applicants in Munich, though no significant discrimination in Berlin).
106 See, e.g., Devah Pager, The Use of Field Experiments for Studies of Employment Discrimination:
Contributions, Critiques, and Directions for the Future, 609 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 104,
126-27 (2007) (identifying potential harm to subjects of discrimination field experiments, including loss of
time and legal liability); Peter A. Riach & Judith Rich, Deceptive Field Experiments of Discrimination: Are
They Ethical?, 57 KYKLOS 457, 459 (2004) (calling for attention to ethical implications of discrimination
field experiments on grounds of deception and absence of informed consent).
107 The principal criticisms are that (1) these studies are only useful for examining callbacks
for entry-level jobs, and (2) relatedly, these studies are only useful for firms that conduct traditional
job searches. See Dan-Olof Rooth, Correspondence Testing Studies, 58 IZA WORLD LAB., May 2014,
at 1, 5-6 (discussing external validity concerns in correspondence studies).
108 See Guillermina Jasso, Factorial Survey Methods for Studying Beliefs and Judgments, 34 SOC.
METHODS & RES. 334, 410-11 (2006) (advocating for the use of the factorial survey method, which
“would make possible quantitative assessment of the precise effects of age, experience, and other factors
on the components of beliefs/judgments”); Peter H. Rossi & Andy B. Anderson, The Factorial Survey
Approach: An Introduction, in MEASURING SOCIAL JUDGMENTS: THE FACTORIAL SURVEY
APPROACH 15 (Peter H. Rossi & Steven L. Nock eds., 1982); Lisa Wallander, 25 Years of Factorial
Surveys in Sociology: A Review, 38 SOC. SCI. RES. 505, 508 (2009) (reviewing 106 vignette studies in
sociology over three decades, of which forty-nine addressed topics in crime, law, and deviance).
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through empirical analysis,109 an abundance of anecdotal evidence suggests that
returning mothers’ prospects are far weaker.110 Given the limited number of
available, relevant jobs to which we could submit fictitious, yet realistic
résumés, conducting a résumé audit study would require an enormous sample
size to detect statistically significant differences in callbacks, once again making
the résumé audit approach undesirable.
Likely all of the above concerns with résumé audit studies have led vignette
studies to become the more common approach among legal scholars in
experimental work. Legal scholarship has frequently relied upon vignette studies
to draw inferences regarding individual behavior in the negotiation, formation,
assent, and breach of contracts.111 Legal scholarship has also seen several recent
vignette studies testing juror understanding and juror decisionmaking,112 as well
as testing intellectual property law concepts.113 Nevertheless, such studies have
been virtually absent from employment law scholarship. The only vignette study
109 For a résumé audit study demonstrating that older women are less likely than younger
women to receive interview requests for entry-level jobs, see Lahey, supra note 101, at 37.
110 See, e.g., Kelly Wallace, Moms ‘Opting In’ to Work Find Doors Shut, CNN (Aug. 13, 2013, 3:41 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/13/living/parents-mothers-opt-to-work/index.html [https://perma.cc/26TH
-753Z] (reporting on a survey conducted by a small, local nonprofit that found “38.3% [of stay-at-home
mothers] said they wanted to return but were having difficulty getting back in, and an ‘overwhelming’
53.7% cited resistance to hiring because of their stay-at-home status”); Tara Weiss, How Stay-at-Home
Moms Can Get Back to Work, FORBES (May 19, 2009, 5:15 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/19/
relaunch-career-woman-leadership-careers-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/6FX6-RJC7] (“Returning to work
is a challenge even in a strong job market . . . .”).
111 See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 1003, 1022-32 (2010) (conducting a vignette study to analyze perceptions of contract breach);
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract Formation, 67 STAN. L.
REV. 1269, 1281-95 (2015) (conducting a vignette study to analyze subjects’ intuitions about contract
formation); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The Psychology of Contract Precautions, 80 U.
CHI. L. REV. 395, 408-18 (2013) (conducting a vignette study to analyze parties’ diverging approaches
to self-protection before and after they perceive that they have reached final agreement).
112 See, e.g., Matthew R. Ginther et al., The Language of Mens Rea, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1327, 1349-58
(2014) (studying juror perceptions of mens rea culpability categories); Joni Hersch & Beverly
Moran, Coitus and Consequences in the Legal System: An Experimental Study, 68 SMU L. REV. 927,
935-44 (2015) (investigating whether and how knowledge of a previous sexual relationship between
legal adversaries influences subjects’ perceptions of appropriate outcome in civil actions); Justin
Sevier, Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and Psychological Distance, 103 GEO. L.J. 879, 903-922
(2015) (investigating juror discernment of hearsay evidence); Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty
Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1326-44 (2011) (measuring subjects’ ability to apply the legal
definitions of mens rea in specific factual contexts).
113 See, e.g., Ian Ayres et al., A Randomized Experiment Assessing the Accuracy of Microsoft’s “Bing
It On” Challenge, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 23-24 (2013) (finding that subjects typically preferred
Google search results over Bing results, suggesting potentially actionable misleading advertising in
Microsoft’s “Bing It On” campaign); Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al., Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L.
REV. 267, 289 (2014) (finding that evidence on other potential issues in a copyright claim significantly
influences the assessment of the two works’ similarity); Christopher Buccafusco et al., Experimental Tests
of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1946-71 (2014) (testing use of a
creativity threshold as an incentive in patent law).
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that has any relevance to employment law is a 2013 article by Ian Ayres and
Richard Luedeman, which examined whether the type of sexual activity among
gay men influenced subjects’ likelihood of inviting them to a barbecue event.114
Although the vignette itself did not relate to employment, the authors
extrapolated the results to consider implications for Title VII sex stereotyping
claims brought by lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals
under Price Waterhouse.115 As evidenced by the Ayres and Luedeman article—not
to mention the vignette studies in other areas of legal scholarship—vignette
studies present a unique opportunity to study the effects of employment laws,
both in the workplace and in the courtroom, that are otherwise untestable
through observational data. For all these reasons, we chose a vignette study for
our experiment, which is detailed in the next Part.
V. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
For our vignette study, we designed a realistic scenario based on the situation
women face when reentering the labor market after an extended period out of
the workforce as a stay-at-home mother. Our scenario asks respondents to choose
between two female applicant finalists to hire. Both applicants have a period of
successful work experience before leaving the workforce for a ten-year period.
The gap in their employment history implies that the applicants were unlikely
to be able to resume their careers at the level they held when they exited. But
their work history also indicates that an entry-level job would not be suitable for
long. Extensive literature on job mismatch shows that overqualified workers are
less satisfied with their jobs and more likely to quit, particularly when the job
lacks sufficient opportunity for promotion.116 Consequently, faced with training
114 See generally Ian Ayres & Richard Luedeman, Tops, Bottoms, and Versatiles: What Straight Views of
Penetrative Preferences Could Mean for Sexuality Claims Under Price Waterhouse, 123 YALE L.J. 714 (2013).
115 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see also id. at 714 (concluding that contrary to the decisions of some
federal courts, some sexuality-related sex stereotyping claims are viable under the Price Waterhouse line
of cases, since “[t]here are real forms of gender-motivated prejudice against a person’s sexuality that are
distinct from prejudice against having actual or desired partners of the same sex”).
116 Job matching (and mismatching) is a term widely used by economists to signify the fit (or lack
thereof) between the requirements of the job at hand and the education and skills of the applicant hired
to do the job. See generally Jim Allen & Rolf van der Velden, Educational Mismatches Versus Skill
Mismatches: Effects on Wages, Job Satisfaction, and On-the-Job Search, 53 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 434
(2001) (exploring the effect of education–job mismatches on wages and job satisfaction); see also Greg
J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, The Incidence and Wage Effects of Overeducation, 1 ECON. EDUC. REV.
75, 84 (1981) (finding that overeducated workers are more highly paid than their adequately educated
and undereducated peers); Joni Hersch, Optimal ‘Mismatch’ and Promotions, 33 ECON. INQUIRY 611,
623 (1995) (arguing that it is in a firm’s best interest to have at least some overqualified workers);
Boyan Jovanovic, Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover, 87 J. POL. ECON. 972, 975-82 (1979)
(constructing a model to explain the rate of turnover as a function of worker productivity); Nachum
Sicherman, “Overeducation” in the Labor Market, 9 J. LAB. ECON. 101, 103-05 (1991) (exploring the
demographic characteristics of “overeducated” workers); Richard R. Verdugo & Naomi Turner
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and hiring costs, employers may refrain from hiring overqualified workers.117
We therefore stressed in our scenario that even though the job was entry-level,
advancement was rapid.
Because we examined hiring decisions between a pair of women of similar
age and background, we did not expect animus- or taste-based discrimination118
to be a relevant factor. As explained in Part III, we also did not anticipate
statistical discrimination to be relevant since observers should have drawn
similar inferences about the family status of similarly situated women. We
allowed for actual productivity differences by providing different information
about our candidates so that any differences in the perceived variance of
productivity-related characteristics would be based on information provided in
the vignette, rather than assumptions about unobserved characteristics.
With these issues in mind, we designed our vignette study to present
respondents with different backgrounds and motivations for each of the two
female candidates seeking re-employment. After drafting our survey instrument,
we extensively pretested it and received approval from our university’s
Institutional Review Board. We fielded the final survey instrument on 3022
voluntary workers who opted in to perform tasks via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(mTurk) service.119 Workers eligible for participation had to be at least eighteen
years old and had to reside in the United States. We paid $1.50 to each worker
who successfully completed the survey, which we advised would take (and, on
average, actually took) about fifteen minutes to complete.120 In accordance with
Verdugo, The Impact of Surplus Schooling on Earnings, 24 J. HUM. RESOURCES 629, 640 (1989) (finding
that overeducated workers often earn less than their adequately educated and undereducated peers).
117 See Hersch, supra note 116, at 619-20 (finding that employers hire overqualified workers
because they have lower training costs and are more likely to be promoted, although those
overqualified workers who are not promoted are more likely to quit).
118 Here, we use the term “taste-based discrimination” in the same manner used by Gary Becker to
refer to discrimination against African-Americans in his classic 1957 work The Economics of Discrimination.
GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971).
119 Our survey complied on all dimensions with the Guidelines for Academic Requesters using mTurk
workers as disseminated by Dynamo. Dynamo is an online community platform, similar to the Reddit
platform, created by top academic mTurk users for the purpose of gathering and sharing information among
peers. See generally Guidelines for Academic Requesters, DYNAMO WIKI, http://wiki.wearedynamo.org/in
dex.php/Guidelines_for_Academic_Requesters [https://perma.cc/4XJA-9V5Q] (last updated July 23, 2016).
120 Readers unfamiliar with mTurk may be surprised that we obtained more than 3000 responses
within a single day, with payment for survey completion equivalent to $6.00 an hour. Relatedly, readers
may be concerned that only individuals with a low value of time would bother to complete a fifteen-minute
survey for a payment of $1.50. To quell such concerns, we compared the demographic characteristics of
our respondents to those of the U.S. population. A comparison to census data shows that our
respondents were either very similar to, or better educated and more likely to be employed, relative to
the U.S. population. For example, our sample was 51.5% female, compared to 50.8% of the U.S.
population. The median household income in our sample was $52,500 (which we derived using
bracketed income ranges), compared to $53,545 nationally. The share of respondents who report their
race as white only in our sample was 80.6%, slightly above the U.S. population share of single race
white of 77.4%. The share in our sample reporting single race black/African-American was 7.5%, and
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prior mTurk research, we launched our survey on a weekday during East Coast
daylight hours.121 Our survey provided a total of four scenarios; below, we limit
our discussion to the one scenario of relevance to this Article.122
Experimental subjects, who were directed from mTurk to the survey
instrument,123 were randomly assigned to view one of nine experimental
conditions that varied the explanation (or provided no information) for the
ten-year employment gap that was common to each of the two finalists. All
subjects were given the following information:
Assume you work at a medium-sized financial management firm. Your firm has
a vacancy for the position of Research Analyst, and you have been asked to make
the hiring decision. Although this is an entry-level position, advancement is
often rapid, with high earnings potential.
After reviewing many applications, you narrow the field down to 2 candidates,
Lisa Davis and Jessica Wilson.
In many ways, the résumés for Lisa and Jessica show similar educational
background and work histories. Each received her college degree 20 years ago,
each majored in psychology, and each worked for 10 years after college as a
Research Associate in a medium-sized financial management firm. Neither lists
any work experience for the past 10 years.
Lisa Davis is a graduate of a well-known, elite university.
Jessica Wilson is a graduate of a local public university.

reporting Hispanic/Latino was 7.3%. The corresponding U.S. population shares are 13.2%
black/African-American and 17.4% Hispanic/Latino. Our sample was far more educated than the U.S.
population, with 54.1% of those age 25 and older holding bachelor’s degrees or higher, in contrast to
28.8% in the U.S. population. Our sample employment rate was also higher, with 81.2% of our sample
employed, compared to 59.5% nationally. Our sample was on average younger than the average U.S.
worker with a median age of 32 versus 42.4 among employed persons in the U.S. population. Overall,
when our sample differed from the population, the direction favored the characteristics associated with
decisionmakers in the employment setting.
121 See Ilyana Kuziemko et al., How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from
Randomized Survey Experiments, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1478, 1484 (2015) (“[T]o further discourage
foreign workers, we tried to launch our surveys during East Coast daylight hours (and, to reduce
heterogeneity, only on workdays).”). We launched our survey on Monday, December 7, 2015, at 8:30
a.m. EST and met our target of 3000 valid responses that same day.
122 Our survey contained two hiring scenarios asking subjects to choose between two eligible
candidates (the present Article reports the results of one of these scenarios). Our survey also contained
two scenarios asking subjects to distribute marital assets between divorcing spouses.
123 This survey was programmed using the survey software, Qualtrics. This methodology (recruiting
workers from mTurk and redirecting them to a Qualtrics survey) is extremely common for scholars
conducting vignette study research. See, e.g., Balganesh et al., supra note 113, at 279.

2016]

Something to Talk About

77

In all nine versions of the scenario, each candidate also reports that she
realizes finding a job is difficult after a ten-year employment gap and that she
is open to working in any industry and at an entry-level job.
We intentionally chose the names for our candidates to be common and
neutral with respect to signals of race and social class.124 We also structured
the finalist candidates to differ only in the status of the academic institution
that conferred their undergraduate degree, in order to make the candidates
similar in background while still allowing the two candidates to differ on an
observable characteristic that may relate to productivity.125 Because our
scenario stresses opportunity for rapid advancement, implying that long-term
attachment to the employer is valued, we were interested in which signal
provided by graduation from an elite institution would dominate—ability or
labor force attachment—when all other attributes of the two candidates were
the same. After establishing the candidates’ common background, we varied
the reasons given for leaving the workforce ten years ago and for deciding to
return to the workforce. To focus on the role of ambiguity aversion among
decisionmakers, the provided information (described below) does not
indicate whether the candidate would be more or less productive as an
employee than the candidate who did not provide information.
Our nine combinations are as follows, with the letters A through I
indicating which version of the scenarios included that information for at
least one of the candidates.

124 For our candidates, we chose neutral-sounding names that have been common over a long period
of time so that survey subjects would be unlikely to associate the names with any particular time period.
(Contrast, for instance, Mildred, the sixth most popular name in the 1910s, and Madison, the second most
popular name in the 2000s. Top Names of the 1910s, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/oact/baby
names/decades/names1910s.html [https://perma.cc/8SCQ-NQEL].) Given the information we provided
on our candidates’ work history, Lisa and Jessica would have been born in the 1970s. At the time, Lisa was
the sixth most common female baby name, and Jessica the eleventh. Top Names of the 1970s, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/oact/babynames/decades/names1970s.html [https://perma.cc/ZET4-PPJH].
Furthermore, Lisa and Jessica have retained considerable staying power as female baby names. Over the
past one hundred years, the name Lisa is the fifteenth most common name, and Jessica is the eighth most
common name. Top Names over the Last 100 Years, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/oact/baby
names/decades/century.html [https://perma.cc/S5TX-4UCR]. We also chose common surnames. In the
1970s, the surname Davis was the eighth most common surname, and the surname Wilson was the tenth
most common surname. OFFICE OF OPERATIONAL POLICY & PROCEDURES, DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., SSA PUB. NO. 42-004, REPORT OF DISTRIBUTION OF SURNAMES IN THE SOCIAL
SECURITY NUMBER FILE, SEPTEMBER 1, 1984, 65, 105 (1985), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015029
219030?urlappend=%3Bseq=1 [https://perma.cc/6XS9-VEX4].
125 Our primary objective was to provide some distinction between candidates, though subjects may
have made inferences about the candidates’ workforce commitment based on information about where the
candidate attended college. See Joni Hersch, Opting Out Among Women with Elite Education, 11 REV. ECON.
HOUSEHOLD 469, 480-81 (2013) (demonstrating that among married women with children, labor market
activity is lower among graduates of elite institutions than graduates of non-elite institutions).
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Scenario A (both candidates married and reason for reentry is children in school):
During the interview, each candidate voluntarily explains that, because she and
her husband believed they could live comfortably on his earnings alone, she
stopped working for pay 10 years ago when the first of her 2 children was born.
Now that the children are in school during the day, she wants to go back to work.
Scenario E (both candidates divorced and reason for reentry is financial): During the
interview, each candidate voluntarily explains that, because she and her
husband believed they could live comfortably on his earnings alone, she stopped
working for pay 10 years ago when the first of her 2 children was born. Each
candidate is recently divorced from her ex-husband, and, financially, she needs
to go back to work.
Scenarios B and D (one candidate married and reason for reentry is children in school,
one candidate divorced and reason for reentry is financial): During the interview,
Lisa (alternatively, Jessica) voluntarily explains that, because she and her husband
believed they could live comfortably on his earnings alone, she stopped working
for pay 10 years ago when the first of her 2 children was born. Now that the
children are in school during the day, she wants to go back to work. . . . During
the interview, Jessica (alternatively, Lisa) voluntarily explains that, because she
and her husband believed they could live comfortably on his earnings alone, she
stopped working for pay 10 years ago when the first of her 2 children was born.
She is recently divorced from her ex-husband, and, financially, she needs to go
back to work.
Scenarios C and G (one candidate married and reason for reentry is children in school,
one candidate gives no reason for leaving or reentering): During the interview, Lisa
(alternatively, Jessica) voluntarily explains that, because she and her husband
believed they could live comfortably on his earnings alone, she stopped working
for pay 10 years ago when the first of her 2 children was born. Now that the children
are in school during the day, she wants to go back to work. . . . During the interview,
Jessica (alternatively, Lisa) does not explain her 10-year employment gap.
Scenarios F and H (one candidate divorced and reason for reentry is financial, one
candidate gives no reason for leaving or reentering): During the interview, Lisa
(alternatively, Jessica) voluntarily explains that, because she and her husband
believed they could live comfortably on his earnings alone, she stopped working for
pay 10 years ago when the first of her 2 children was born. She is recently divorced
from her ex-husband, and, financially, she needs to go back to work. . . . During the
interview, Jessica (alternatively, Lisa) does not explain her 10-year employment gap.
Scenario I (neither candidate gives a reason for leaving or reentering): During the
interview, neither candidate explains her 10-year employment gap.

2016]

Something to Talk About

79

Finally, all versions of the scenario concluded as follows:
Each candidate has strong references, and after the interviews, you believe
that you could easily work with either candidate.
Which candidate will you hire for the position of Research Analyst?

At this point, we asked subjects to select either Lisa Davis or Jessica Wilson.
Here we note that personal information for reentering the workforce, in sharp
contrast to academic credentials or prior work experience, does not provide clear
signals about expected productivity. For instance, some may view a candidate
who reports she is returning to the workforce because her children are in school
during the day to be eager to return to work and likely to be highly productive,
while others may view this same woman as likely to quit if work–family balance
becomes too challenging. Similarly, the divorced candidate may be perceived as
financially motivated to be productive, or as less productive because of greater
childcare demands falling on a single parent. Thus, relative to an alternative
candidate who provides no personal information for reentering the workforce,
there is no reason to expect that, on average, the candidate who provides
information will be more productive than one who does not. Nonetheless, the
additional information may bolster decisionmakers’ confidence in their assessment
of the candidate’s likely future productivity. As the results from our experiment
show, decisionmakers choose the candidate who provides more personal
information over the candidate who does not provide personal information,
consistent with the theory of ambiguity aversion.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The employment outcome of interest is whether experimental subjects
choose to hire Lisa, the elite university graduate, or Jessica, the local public
university graduate. We examine how information revealed in interviews
influence hiring decisions in two ways. First, we examine which of the two
candidates is selected within a given scenario. Because the choice of one
candidate implies that the other candidate is not chosen, the appropriate
statistical test is a one-sample test of proportions. Our null hypothesis is that
the probability of hiring either candidate is the same and is equal to 0.50. The
relevant alternative hypotheses vary by scenario and are indicated in the
following Sections. Second, we examine how the probability that a candidate
is selected will vary based on the differences in the information provided
about that candidate, holding all else equal. For instance, we examine how the
probability that Lisa is hired differs when she is divorced versus when she is
married, holding constant the information provided about Jessica. Because
this test is across scenarios, and because subjects see only one of the nine
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scenarios, each scenario comprises an independent sample. For these tests
within individuals, the appropriate statistical test is a two-sample test for
differences in proportions. The null hypothesis is that the probability a
specific candidate is hired is equal across scenarios. Again, because hiring one
candidate implies that the other candidate is not chosen, it does not matter
which candidate’s probability of being hired we examine.
A. Testing Candidate Selection Within a Single Scenario
Before describing our results, we pause to detail (1) the specifics of each
test and (2) our ex ante predictions. First, when both candidates provide the
same information (scenarios A, E, and I), we test for whether one candidate
is more likely to be hired than the other, but we make no prediction about
whether the signal of Lisa’s elite degree will make it more likely that she is
hired over Jessica because of her expected greater ability, or less likely to be
hired because her elite degree is associated with weaker labor force
attachment. Second, when one candidate provides a reason for the gap in her
employment history and the other does not (scenarios C, F, G, H), we predict
that the candidate who provides a reason is more likely to be hired. This
follows from the behavioral economics theory of ambiguity aversion. Finally,
when one candidate gives her reason for reentering the workforce as financial
and the other gives her reason as children in school (scenarios B and D), we
predict that the candidate whose reason is financial is more likely to be hired.
Table 1 reports the results for scenarios A, E, and I. When both candidates
provide the same information, we find that Lisa (elite degree) is more likely
to be hired than Jessica when both are married and report the reason for
reentry is children in school. Similarly, we find that Lisa is more likely to be
hired when neither candidate reports any information. The probability that
Lisa is more likely to be hired relative to the null that each candidate is equally
likely to be hired is statistically significant at the 5% level in a two-sided test,
with precisely the same share—56.1%—preferring to hire Lisa in both of these
scenarios. In contrast, when both candidates are divorced and report that their
reason for reentry is financial, there is no statistically significant difference in
the probability that Lisa or Jessica is hired.
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Table 1: Probability That a Candidate Is Hired When Both Candidates
Provide the Same Reason for Reentry
Scenario

Marital
Status

Reason
for Reentry

Percent
Who Would
Hire Lisa

P-Value

N

A

Married

Children in
school

56.1

0.03

337

E

Divorced

Financial

51.8

0.51

338

I

None

None

56.1

0.03

337

Notes: Null hypothesis is that candidates are equally likely to be offered the job. P-value is calculated
using a one-sample test of proportions.

Table 2 reports the results for scenarios C, F, G, and H. When one
candidate provides a reason for reentry but the other does not, the candidate
who provides the reason is far more likely to be hired. As Table 2 shows, when
Lisa provides information about marital status and reason for reentry (and
Jessica provides no information), Lisa is selected by 86.5% of the subjects when
she is married and by 88.9% when she is divorced. Conversely, when Jessica
provides information about marital status and reason for reentry (and Lisa
provides no information), Jessica is selected by 81.5% of the subjects when she
is married and by 80.4% when she is divorced. The slight edge that Lisa has
over Jessica in being selected derives from her higher baseline likelihood of
being hired, which apparently reflects the employment advantage of her elite
undergraduate degree.
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Table 2. Probability That a Candidate Is Hired When One Candidate
Provides a Reason for Reentry and the Other Candidate Does Not
Scenario

Marital
Status

Reason for
Reentry

Percent
Who Would
Hire Lisa

P-Value

N

C

Lisa
married

Lisa
children in
school

86.5

0.00

334

F

Lisa
divorced

Lisa
financial

88.9

0.00

334

G

Jessica
married

Jessica
children in
school

18.5

0.00

336

H

Jessica
divorced

Jessica
financial

19.6

0.00

332

Notes: Null hypothesis is that candidates are equally likely to be offered the job. P-value is calculated
using a one-sample test of proportions.

These findings show that decisionmakers overwhelmingly demonstrate
ambiguity aversion when deciding whom to hire. Moreover, as long as candidates
provide a reason for their reentry into the workforce, the actual reason itself
matters little. Furthermore, as indicated below in Table 2A, women are more
likely than men to hire the candidate who provides a reason for reentry. In both
scenarios in which Jessica is the candidate providing information, the difference
by sex of subject is statistically significant at the 10% level. These results are in
accordance with prior work by economists,126 who have previously demonstrated
that women are more ambiguity-averse than are men.

126 See generally Eckel & Grossman, supra note 87 (surveying experimental literature in economics
showing that women demonstrate more ambiguity aversion than men).

2016]

83

Something to Talk About

Table 2A: Probability That a Candidate Is Hired When One Candidate
Provides a Reason for Reentry and the Other Candidate
Does Not, by Sex of Subject
Scenario

Marital
Status

Reason
for
Reentry

Percent Who
Would Hire
Lisa - Male

Percent Who
Would Hire
Lisa - Female

P-Value for
Test of
Differences
by Sex of
Subject

N
(Male/
Female)

C

Lisa
married

Lisa
children
in school

83.8

88.7

0.19

148/186

F

Lisa
divorced

Lisa
financial

87.0

90.8

0.27

161/173

G

Jessica
married

Jessica
children
in school

22.6

14.5

0.06

164/172

H

Jessica
divorced

Jessica
financial

26.5

14.1

0.00

147/185

Notes: Null hypothesis is that male and female subjects are equally likely to offer the same candidate the job. P-value is
calculated using a two-sample test of proportions.

Table 3 reports the results for scenarios B and D. When both candidates
provide a reason for reentry but one candidate’s reason is financial and the
other’s is children in school, the candidate seeking work for financial reasons is
far more likely to be hired. Table 3 demonstrates that when Jessica reports a
divorce-related financial reason for reentry and Lisa’s reason for reentry is
children in school, 64.4% of subjects hire Jessica. Conversely, when Lisa reports
a divorce-related financial reason for reentry and Jessica’s reason for reentry is
children in school, 73.9% of subjects hire Lisa. Once again, we attribute the
slight edge that Lisa has over Jessica to the higher baseline likelihood of being
hired that seems to relate to Lisa’s elite undergraduate degree.
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Table 3: Probability That a Candidate Is Hired When the Reason for Reentry
Is Financial Versus When the Reason Is Children in School
Scenario

B

D

Marital
Status

Reason
for
Reentry

Percent
Who Would
Hire Lisa

P-Value

N

Lisa
married,
Jessica
divorced

Lisa
children in
school,
Jessica
financial

35.6

0.00

337

Lisa
divorced,
Jessica
married

Lisa
financial,
Jessica
children in
school

73.9

0.00

337

Notes: Null hypothesis is that candidates are equally likely to be offered the job. P-value is calculated
using a one-sample test of proportions.

B. Testing Candidate Selection Across Multiple Scenarios
Next, we examine candidate selection across more than one scenario. We
consider how the probability that a candidate is hired is affected by differences
in her marital status and her reason for reentry when the other candidate’s
characteristics are held constant. Before describing our results, we pause to
detail (1) the specifics of each test and (2) our ex ante predictions. Ex ante, we
predict that, all else equal, when a candidate reports any reason for reentry, she
is more likely to be hired than when she does not report a reason. We also
expect that a candidate is more likely to be hired when she reports her reason
for reentry is financial instead of children in school. We report the actual results
of our two-sample test for differences in proportions below in Table 4.
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Table 4: Probability That Lisa Is Hired When Her Characteristics Differ,
Holding Jessica’s Characteristics Constant
Lisa
Married,
Children
in School

Lisa
Divorced,
Financial

Lisa, No
Information

Significant
Differences
Between
Scenarios

Jessica
Married,
Children in
School

56.1 (A)

73.9 (D)

18.5 (G)

All

Jessica
Divorced,
Financial

35.6 (B)

51.8 (E)

19.6 (H)

All

Jessica, No
Information

86.5 (C)

88.9 (F)

56.1 (I)

C - I, F - I

Notes: Scenario tested is in parentheses following the estimated probability of hiring Lisa. Statistical
significance in differences at the 1% level is calculated using a two-sample test for differences in proportions.

Table 4 demonstrates that giving a reason for reentry, and what that
reason is, both have a strong influence on the probability a candidate is hired.
When both Lisa and Jessica report that their reason for reentry is children in
school, subjects prefer to hire Lisa 56.1% of the time. But if Lisa is instead
divorced and reentering because of financial need, while Jessica’s reason
remains children in school, the probability Lisa is hired increases by 17.8
percentage points. Providing children in school as her reason for reentry,
relative to providing no information, increases the probability that Lisa is
hired by 37.6 percentage points (holding constant Jessica reporting children
in school as her reason for reentry). Yet providing a financial reason for
reentry, relative to providing no information, increases the probability that
Lisa is hired by an astonishing 55.4 percentage points.
As we noted earlier in Table 1, when both Lisa and Jessica report they are
divorced and have a financial reason for reentry, Lisa and Jessica have exactly
the same statistical probability of being hired. Holding constant Jessica
reporting a financial reason for reentry, Table 4 demonstrates that the
probability Lisa is hired is 16.2 percentage points higher when her reason for
reentry is financial, as compared to when her reason for reentry is children in
school. Once again, as long as Lisa reports any reason for reentry, there is a large
increase in the probability that Lisa is hired. When Lisa reenters because of
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children in school, there is a 16.0 percentage point increase, and when Lisa
reenters for financial reasons, there is a 32.2 percentage point increase.
Finally, holding constant Jessica not providing any reason for reentry, the
results in the last row demonstrate that when only one candidate provides a
reason for reentry, she is overwhelmingly more likely to be hired. There is no
significant difference in the probability that Lisa is hired when her reason for
reentry is children in school versus when her reason for reentry is financial.
CONCLUSION
The results in Part VI unambiguously indicate that providing more
information is better for female applicants returning to the workforce. Yet as
discussed in Part I,127 the EEOC guidance restricts the flow of such information
by discouraging employers from broaching the subject of family. This guidance
reflects a widespread, overly cautious reading of the Title VII case law; employers,
understandably, would rather be safe than sorry when it comes to liability.128 The
practical result of such a reading, however, is a strong employer-side norm that
shuts down employer-initiated inquiries about family status. The reality for
women who are returning to the workplace after a family-status-related career
break is that employers are too afraid to ask the questions they want, and
arguably need, to ask about breaks in candidates’ employment histories. Unless
these women volunteer their family-status information, potential employers
remain in a state of uncertainty, forced to answer their underlying questions about
a résumé gap with little to go on other than stereotypes and assumptions—precisely
what Title VII is meant to avoid.
Compounding this harm is the strong employee-side norm that has developed
against returning female applicants volunteering their family status. The origin
of the employee-side norm may have emerged from a desire to conform to the
standard model of the dedicated worker who prioritizes work over family, or it
may derive from yet another misunderstanding of Title VII’s prohibitions. In any
event, the employee-side norm exacerbates the information-restricting effects of
the EEOC guidance and employer-side norm by ensuring that many employers
remain in a state of ambiguity when trying to interpret a break in female
applicants’ employment histories. This state of ambiguity may well lead
employers to avoid hiring women not because they would rather hire men, but
because they prefer certainty over uncertainty. Men are less likely to have
See supra text accompanying note 42.
This observation is reminiscent of the precautionary principle in the risk context. See generally
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2003) (reviewing the
limitations of regulatory approaches to risk that adopt the precautionary principle of better safe than
sorry); W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547 (2000) (documenting
the concerns that major corporations have with respect to liability risks).
127
128
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family-related career gaps on their résumé;129 as such, there is simply less
opportunity for ambiguity in the résumés of male applicants.
Our results necessarily raise two questions. First, how could a well-intentioned
employment discrimination law and its surrounding jurisprudence backfire on
precisely the group it was meant to protect? Second, is there a way to relieve the
information-restricting effects that have developed around Title VII, whether
through EEOC guidance or case law, without simultaneously undoing the positive
effects Title VII has had on the workplace? We suggest that one potential model
for restoring the flow of information is the interactive process model used under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). When an individual has a disability
that affects their ability to work, and the individual desires a disability-related
reasonable accommodation from an employer, the EEOC guidance recommends
that the parties engage in an interactive process:
After a request for accommodation has been made, the next step is for the parties
to begin the interactive process to determine what, if any, accommodation should
be provided. This means that the individual requesting the accommodation and the
[Disability Program Manager] must communicate with each other about the request,
the precise nature of the problem that is generating the request, how a disability is
prompting a need for an accommodation, and alternative accommodations that may
be effective in meeting an individual’s needs.130

The interactive process is not codified in the statutory text of the ADA; it is
an innovation of the EEOC guidance, meant to further the underlying purposes
of the ADA. Despite its common origins in the EEOC, the ADA guidance is
diametrically opposed to the Title VII guidance in its stance on information
regulation. While the ADA guidance is meant to encourage the free flow of
information, the Title VII guidance is meant to circumscribe it. The results of
our study confirm that employment discrimination guidance limiting the flow of
information from employee to employer and vice versa is misdirected. Whether
the subject of the information is family status, criminal history, or disability
accommodation, underserved groups are best served when they can have open
and honest conversations with their employers.131 In the absence of such

129 Currently, there are five times as many stay-at-home mothers as stay-at-home fathers. Compare
Livingston, supra note 24, at 1 (finding two million stay-at-home fathers in 2012), with COHN ET AL., supra
note 19, at 6 (finding 10.4 million stay-at-home mothers in 2012).
130 Procedures for Providing Reasonable Accommodation for Individuals with Disabilities, U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/internal/reasonable_accommodation
.cfm [https://perma.cc/8MVG-TCFQ].
131 See, e.g., Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical
Discrimination: A Field Experiment 38 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 16-012, 2016) (finding that ban-the-box policies harm employment prospects of African-American
men because lack of information introduces statistical discrimination).
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conversations, ambiguity aversion sets in for employers, thus limiting, and even
undoing, the positive effects of employment discrimination laws.
In proposing a transformation of the EEOC Title VII guidance from
information-stifling to information-promoting, we do not mean to suggest
that job applicants should begin listing their complete personal and family
histories in résumés, applications, and cover letters. Advocates for employer
credit-check bans and ban-the-box laws are concerned that employers will
automatically throw out applications that check the wrong box or fail to meet
a certain benchmark, without any further consideration.132 We, too, worry
that a woman who advertises she is pregnant in her cover letter, or who lists
the births of her six children on her résumé, will immediately see her
application tossed by the employer without any further consideration.133
What we advocate for is an increase in honest conversations at the interview
stage. Instead of remaining shrouded in taboo and concerns about potential
illegality, personal history and family matters should be something to talk
about during the interview, something to deepen both the employer’s and the
applicant’s understanding of each others’ wants and needs.
Besides reducing the number of applicants who fall victim to employer ambiguity
aversion, legal policy that promotes a deeper understanding between employers
and applicants, we believe, will have two additional, positive repercussions in the
workplace. First, such a policy should improve the quality of job matching
between applicants and the positions for which they are hired. An extensive
economics literature demonstrates that workers who are less satisfied with their
132 See, e.g., Amy Traub, Discredited: How Employment Credit Checks Keep Qualified Workers Out of a
Job, DĒMOS (2013), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Discredited-Demos.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3MYD-HCHX] (characterizing employer credit checks as an “illegitimate barrier to
employment”); Ban the Box Campaign, LEGAL SERVICES FOR PRISONERS WITH CHILDREN (2016),
http://www.prisonerswithchildren.org/our-projects/allofus-or-none/ban-the-box-campaign/ [https://p
erma.cc/RUV5-RASZ] (describing employment practices that ask about criminal history as “lifelong
discrimination and exclusion because of a past arrest or conviction record”); Editorial, Millions Need
Not Apply, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2011, at A18 (“Using a credit record as a key factor in hiring could
marginalize millions of families and create a new, credit-record underclass.”); see also Kimani PaulEmile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and Employment Discrimination in the
Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 951 (2014) (“The unfettered access to arrest and conviction data
currently enjoyed by employers perpetuates bias, stigma, and discrimination against people with
criminal records and widens racial disparities.”).
133 In fact, we believe that this concern is precisely why it is so difficult to draw robust conclusions
from résumé audit studies regarding the importance of information flow in the hiring process. Résumé
audit studies can only reveal the effects of advertising personal and family information in a résumé,
cover letter, or form application. Just because including this information on a résumé, cover letter, or
form application may be harmful does not mean that bringing up such information will be harmful in
an interview setting. For examples of résumé audit studies, see Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 98,
at 994-97, which examine the differences in callback rates for résumé featuring white-sounding and
African-American-sounding names, Pierné, supra note 102, at 3-8, which studies the impact that including
certain national or religious affiliations has on hiring in the French real estate sector, and Rooth, supra
note 104, at 716-21, which tests the impact of obesity and attractiveness on hiring outcomes.
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jobs are more likely to quit.134 Similarly, employers and employees whose
expectations are not aligned are more likely to part ways.135 Moreover,
workplaces with more satisfied workers are more productive.136 The costs of
employee turnover are high and include expenses related to the exiting
employee, as well as expenses related to hiring a replacement employee.137 For
workers, quitting or losing a job also imposes considerable turmoil, producing
income instability and increasing employment search costs.138 Nonetheless, our
proposed legal policy can diminish the incidence—and associated costs—of job
mismatch. Increasing information flow between applicant and employer can let
the employer know if the applicant’s personal issues and family life are
compatible with the employer’s expectations before the employer invests too
much time in a relationship doomed to fail. Similarly, promoting honest
conversations can let the applicant know up front if the job requirements are
likely to be compatible with his or her personal and family matters, which should
134 See Joni Hersch, Education Match and Job Match, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 140, 141-44 (1991)
(finding that overqualified workers in the U.S. are both less satisfied with their jobs and more likely
to quit); Alfonso Sousa-Poza & Andrés A. Sousa-Poza, The Effect of Job Satisfaction on Labor Turnover
by Gender: An Analysis for Switzerland, 36 J. SOCIO-ECON. 895, 908 (2007) (showing that reported
job satisfaction predicts future quits).
135 See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Employment Relationships with Joint Employer and Worker
Experimentation, 24 INT’L ECON. REV. 313 (1983) (analyzing how the job matching process involves
uncertainties on behalf of the worker and the employer that only get resolved over time, leading to
turnover for unsuccessful matches); W. Kip Viscusi, Job Hazards and Worker Quit Rates: An Analysis
of Adaptive Worker Behavior, 20 INT’L ECON. REV. 29 (1979) (showing that workers who learn their
job is riskier than expected are more likely to quit).
136 See, e.g., Petri Böckerman & Pekka Ilmakunnas, The Job Satisfaction-Productivity Nexus: A
Study Using Matched Survey and Register Data, 65 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 244, 249-50 (2012)
(demonstrating that within manufacturing plants, an increase in workplace satisfaction is associated
with greater value added per hour).
137 See DAVID G. ALLEN, SHRM FOUND., SOC’Y HUM. RES. MGMT., RETAINING TALENT: A
GUIDE TO ANALYZING AND MANAGING EMPLOYEE TURNOVER 3 (2008), https://www.shrm.org/abo
ut/foundation/research/documents/retaining%20talent-%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SVG-7HUC]
(“Employee departures cost a company time, money, and other resources. Research suggests that direct
replacement costs can reach as high as 50%-60% of an employee’s annual salary, with total costs associated
with turnover ranging from 90% to 200% of annual salary.”); see also Kim E. Ruyle, President, Inventive
Talent Consulting, LLC, SHRM Webcast, Measuring and Mitigating the Costs of Employee Turnover (July 17,
2012), http://inventivetalent.com/pdf/Measuring%20and%20Mitigating%20the%20Cost%20of%20Emplo
yee%20Turnover%20with%20Notes.pdf [https://perma.cc/N36D-7UJU] (reporting that “[t]urnover costs
are often estimated to be 100% – 300% of the base salary of [the] replaced employee (150% commonly cited),”
after accounting for expenses such as severance pay, benefit continuation, and applicant search, hiring, and
training). The actual cost of turnover differs widely by industry and level of employer. See, e.g., Heather
Boushey & Sarah Jane Glynn, There Are Significant Business Costs to Replacing Employees, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS 2 (Nov. 16, 2012), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/16084443/Cost
ofTurnover0815.pdf [https://perma.cc/MXD2-GB32] (reviewing thirty case studies from eleven published
articles, showing that reported turnover costs range from 5.8% to 213% of an employee’s annual salary).
138 See generally Steven J. Davis & Till von Wachter, Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss, 2011
BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 1 (showing that job displacement is associated with substantial
lifetime earnings losses, anxiety, and search costs).
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lead to a more informed decision about whether to accept a job and, in turn, to
increased and more enduring job satisfaction.
Second, and relatedly, we believe that the long-term effects of such a legal
policy may improve conditions with respect to workplace flexibility. A 2014
study by economic historian Claudia Goldin found that while a few industries,
such as healthcare and technology, widely permitted employee flexibility in
working hours and working location, many more traditional industries,
including the corporate, legal, and financial sectors, lagged behind.139 Giving
workers more control over the set of hours worked and the location from which
they work, Goldin argues, is the necessary last step in eliminating the persistent
pay gap between male and female workers.140 But increased flexibility need not
benefit women at the expense of men; instead, she argues, such changes would
benefit any worker, regardless of sex, who valued the flexibility to accommodate
their personal and family lives.141
Stifling honest conversations about personal and family matters, we
suspect, does nothing to improve workplace flexibility. In fact, it may sustain
and exacerbate the continued intransigence of certain industries to changes in
employee working conditions by allowing employers to remain ignorant of
what their workers require to accommodate their personal and family lives.
Thus, removing personal issues and family matters from the category of
unmentionables and instead making them something to talk about can do more
than just improve outcomes for individual employers and employees; such a
policy shift has the potential to spark systemic reforms in the workplace that
are beneficial to all labor market participants, regardless of sex, criminal history,
credit history, socioeconomic status, or minority status.

139 See Claudia Goldin, A Grand Gender Convergence: Its Last Chapter, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1091,
1118 (2014) (“The rapidly growing sectors of the economy and newer industries and occupations, such
as those in health and information technologies, appear to be moving in the direction of more flexibility
and greater linearity of earnings with respect to time worked. The last chapter needs other sectors to
follow their lead.”).
140 See id. at 1092 (“The solution [to closing the gender gap] does not (necessarily) have to involve
government intervention. It does not have to improve women’s bargaining skills and desire to compete.
And it does not necessarily have to make men more responsible in the home (although that wouldn’t
hurt). But it must involve alterations in the labor market, in particular changing how jobs are structured
and remunerated to enhance temporal flexibility.”).
141 See id. at 1118 (“What the last chapter must contain for gender equality is not a zero sum game in
which women gain and men lose. This matter is not just a woman’s issue. Many workers will benefit from
greater flexibility, although those who do not value the amenity will likely lose from its lower price.”).

